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The “annexation” of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the ongoing conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine have resulted in widespread human rights abuses. Both Ukraine and 
the Russian Federation are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Convention should apply within the territory and to the conflict. However, recent 
applications to the European Court of Human Rights reveal a great deal of confusion 
over which State bears responsibility for protecting human rights in different parts of 
Ukraine. This article seeks to shine a light on this problem presenting a deep analysis of 
the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence and discussing how it applies to both 
the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and “annexed” Crimea. It addresses salient issues such as 
responsibility for the actions of non-state actors and armed groups in Eastern Ukraine 
and whether the legality of the “annexation” has any bearing on the human rights 
obligations of each State. The article presents a detailed critique of recent judgments 
from the European Court of Human Rights arguing that the jurisprudence of the Court 
has created a bewildering degree of complexity and uncertainty as to the obligations of 
each State and discussing the practical implications of this uncertainty.
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Introduction
in November 2013, protests broke out in the ukraine when the president, 
viktor yanukovych, refused to sign an association agreement with the european 
union.1 this was a defining moment in the country’s history as it exacerbated long-
standing tensions between citizens favouring closer ties with europe and others who 
1  ukraine Protests After yanukovych eu deal rejection, BBC News, 30 November 2013 (Aug. 2, 2018), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25162563.
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favoured a closer relationship with russia.2 the protests against yanukovych gathered 
in intensity and turned increasingly violent. yanukovych eventually fled office in 
February 2014. his government was replaced by an interim administration and the 
security situation, particularly in the east of the country, continued to worsen.3 in 
late February 2014 pro-russian groups began to take control of public buildings 
on the Crimean peninsula and the by the end of spring parts of the donetsk and 
Luhansk Oblasts were under the control of similar pro-russian units.4 in May 2015 
ukrainian authorities filed derogations with respect to its human rights obligations 
under both the european Convention on human rights 1950 (hereinafter eChr) 
and international Convention on Civil and Political rights 1966.5
in the five years since the conflict began there has been a significant deterioration 
in the protection of human rights within ukraine. the Office of the united Nations 
high Commissioner for human rights has stated that the death toll from the conflict 
now exceeds 2,700, with a further 9,000 individuals injured.6 An estimated 1.6 million 
people have been displaced by the violence.7 human rights watch has reported 
further human rights abuses, including a high number of enforced disappearances, 
the intimidation of pro-ukrainian activists and widespread persecution of minority 
groups, such as the tatars.8 the uN has further reported on instances of alleged 
2  For some historical context on the origins of the conflict in ukraine see Julia koch, The Efficacy and 
Impact of Interim Measures: Ukraine’s Inter-State Application Against Russia, 39(1) Boston College 
international and Comparative Law review 163, 165–170 (2016).
3  shaun walker, Ukraine’s Former PM Rallies Protesters After Yanukovych Flees Kiev, the Guardian, 23 Feb-
ruary 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/22/ukraine-
president-yanukovych-flees-kiev.
4  ukraine Crisis: timeline, BBC News, 13 November 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
5  ukrainian Government, resolution of the verkhovna rada of ukraine on declaration on derogation 
from Certain Obligations under the international Covenant on Civil and Political rights and the 
Convention for the Protection of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 21 May 2015 (Aug. 2, 
2018), available at https://rm.coe.int/CoerMPublicCommonsearchservices/displaydCtMContent?d
ocumentid=0900001680304c47#search=ukraine%20derogate.
6  united Nations Office for the Coordination of humanitarian Affairs, ukraine humanitarian Bulletin, 
issue 25, 1 March – 30 April 2018 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/ukraine_-_humanitarian_bulletin_issue_25_-_mar-apr_2018.pdf. See also uN Calls for 
“New Political energy” to end the Conflict in eastern ukraine, uN News, 29 May 2018 (Aug. 2, 2018), 
available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/05/1010911. the Council on Foreign relations places 
the death-toll significantly higher at over 10,000 – Council on Foreign relations, Global Conflict tracker, 
19 June 2018 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/
conflict/conflict-in-ukraine.
7  uN Calls for “New Political energy,” supra note 6.
8  Crimea: disappeared Man Found killed, human rights watch, 18 March 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available 
at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-found-killed; Crimea: enforced 
disappearances, human rights watch, 7 October 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://www.hrw.
org/news/2014/10/07/crimea-enforced-disappearances.
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torture,9 sexual violence,10 threats to commit ethnic cleansing11 and forced 
conscription.12
the on-going unrest has created considerable uncertainty as to who is ultimately 
responsible for guaranteeing human rights protection within the different parts of 
ukraine. the violence has clearly reached the threshold of an armed conflict at different 
times, although the exact categorisation of the hostilities under international law in 
different parts of the country is open to debate.13 there remain ongoing arguments in 
the international legal forum over whether human rights law applies to armed conflicts 
or whether it should be superseded by international humanitarian law (hereinafter 
ihL).14 indeed russia has already argued that human rights law should not be applied 
to its armed conflict with Georgia in 2008 in an inter-state case before the european 
Court of human rights (hereinafter eCthr).15 Given the similarities between that 
situation and the ukraine crisis, it seems likely that russia will raise a similar argument 
in cases related to the ukrainian conflict. while there is some continued merit to these 
9  Office of the united Nations high Commissioner for human rights, report on the human rights 
situation in ukraine – 16 February to 15 May 2016, 3 June 2016, at 15 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://
www.ohchr.org/documents/Countries/uA/ukraine_14th_hrMMu_report.pdf.
10  Office of the united Nations high Commissioner for human rights, Conflict-related sexual violence 
in ukraine – 14 March 2014 to 31 January 2017, 16 February 2017 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://
www.ohchr.org/documents/Countries/uA/reportCrsv_eN.pdf.
11  Andrew korybko, Ethnic and Cultural Cleansing in Ukraine, Global research, 18 June 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), 
available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/ethnic-and-cultural-cleansing-inukraine/5387539.
12  Office of the united Nations high Commissioner for human rights, report on the human rights situation 
in ukraine – 16 November 2017 to 15 February 2018, 19 March 2018, at 13 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/Countries/uA/reportukraineNov2017-Feb2018_eN.pdf.
13  On the application of the Law of Armed Conflict to ukraine see reeves and wallace who contend 
that the situation in the Crimea would amount to an international armed conflict, while – due to the 
challenges in ascertaining russian influence – the unrest in eastern ukraine would only amount to 
a non-international armed conflict at present. shane r. reeves & david wallace, The Combatant Status 
of the “Little Green Men” and Other Participants in the Ukraine Conflict, 91 international Law student 
series us Naval war Collection 361, 382 (2015).
14  Barbara Miltner, Revisiting Extraterritoriality After Al-Skeini: The ECHR and Its Lessons, 33(4) Michigan 
Journal of international Law 693, 748 (2012); Michelle A. hansen, Preventing the Emasculation of Warfare: 
Halting the Expansion of Human Rights Law into Armed Conflict, 194 Military Law review 1, 65 (2007); 
Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29(6) Cardozo Law review 2461, 2516 (2008); Michael J. 
dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially to Detention of Combatants and Security 
Internees: Fuzzy Thinking All Around, 12(2) iLsA Journal of international & Comparative Law 459, 480 
(2006); heike krieger, A Conflict of Norms the Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11(2) Journal of Conflict & security Law 265, 291 (2006); w. hays 
Parks, Part IX of the ICRC Direct Participation in Hostilities Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally 
Incorrect, 42 New york university Journal of international Law and Politics 769, 830 (2010); rick Lawson, 
Really Out of Sight? Issues of Jurisdiction and Control in Situations of Armed Conflict under the ECHR in 
Margins of Conflict: The ECHR and Transitions to and from Armed Conflict 57 (A. Buyse (ed.), Antwerp: 
intersentia, 2011). For discussion on this subject specifically at the eCthr see Hassan v. United Kingdom, 
Application No. 29750/09, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 16 september 2014, paras. 96–107.
15  Georgia v. Russia (II), Application No. 38263/08, decision (section v), 13 december 2011.
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discussions, the reality is that international human rights law is currently being applied 
to a variety of military operations including international armed conflicts,16 particularly 
by the eCthr. the past decades have seen the eCthr apply the eChr to a variety 
of military operations, including international armed conflicts,17 foreign belligerent 
occupations,18 peace-support operations,19 domestic counter-insurgency operations,20 
and non-international armed conflicts.21 this has prompted calls for a shift in focus 
toward considering the practicalities of how ihrL can actually be applied in day-to-
day military operations at home and abroad.22 in the words of one academic, it is time 
to “stop debating the theory and start defining the pragmatic.”23 this article therefore 
works from the assumption that the eChr applies to the conflict(s) in ukraine.
At it’s the core, the issue of responsibility for human rights protection in ukraine 
is a question of jurisdiction and state responsibility, refracted through the unique 
lens of the european Convention on human rights. section 1 of the Article therefore 
introduces the issues of jurisdiction and state responsibility arising under the eChr. 
the eCthr has placed de facto control over territory or persons at the centre of its 
assessments of jurisdiction. however, it is argued throughout this article that the 
eCthr has failed to apply its tests for de facto control consistently. this has led to 
considerable uncertainty over the scope and content of the obligations owed by 
different states. the following section begins to analyse this issue in the context of 
Crimea, asking to what extent does russia, which claims to have annexed Crimea, 
have responsibility for human rights obligations within that territory? would the 
16  the iCJ has ruled on a number of occasions that international human rights law applies to armed 
conflict – Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 i.C.J. 116, 231. See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 i.C.J. 136, 178.
17  Cyprus v. Turkey, Applications No. 6780/74 and 6950/75, decision, 26 May 1975; Georgia v. Russia (II), 
supra note 15.
18  the occupation of iraq in Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, Application No. 55721/07, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber), 7 July 2011.
19  kosovo in Behrami v. France, Application No. 71412/01, decision (Grand Chamber), 31 May 2007.
20  Counter-insurgency in south-east turkey in Ergi v. Turkey, Case No. 66/1997/850/1057, Judgment, 
28 July 1998.
21  russian operations in Chechnya in Isayeva v. Russia, Application No. 57950/00, decision (section i), 
24 February 2005.
22  Naz k. Modirzadeh, The Dark Sides of Convergence: A Pro-Civilian Critique of the Extraterritorial Application 
of Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict, 86 international Law student series us Naval war Collection 349, 
368 (2010); iain scobbie, Principle of Pragmatics – The Relationship Between Human Rights Law and the 
Law of Armed Conflict, 14(3) Journal of Conflict and security Law 449, 458 (2009); daniel Bethlehem, The 
Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations 
of Armed Conflict, 2(2) Cambridge Journal of international and Comparative Law 180, 195 (2013).
23  Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades The Logical Limits of Applying Human Rights Norms 
to Armed Conflict, 1(1) Journal of international humanitarian Legal studies 52, 90 (2010).
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answer to this question be different if annexation has not occurred and the invading 
state is instead in belligerent occupation of that territory? the third part of the article 
examines the situation in eastern ukraine. it applies the eCthr’s jurisprudence to 
various facets of the conflict asking to what extent is ukraine’s jurisdiction displaced 
by the ongoing conflict? to what extent could russia be held responsible for the 
activities of armed groups in eastern ukraine?
1. Jurisdiction Under the ECHR
According to Article 1, a state’s obligations under the eChr only extend to 
individuals “within their jurisdiction.”24 the state’s jurisdiction is therefore a threshold 
criterion, which must be met before the treaty obligations begin to apply.25 the 
term jurisdiction can describe many different things. it can, for example, refer 
to geographical boundaries or to the limits of a court’s authority.26 when one 
refers to a state’s jurisdiction under general international law, one is referring to 
a manifestation of its sovereignty. A state manifests its sovereignty over territory 
by exercising legislative, judicial and executive jurisdiction over it,27 although this is 
different from the type of jurisdiction contemplated in Article 1 eChr. Many of the 
terms used here, sovereignty, jurisdiction, authority are synonymous with control 
and control is the key factor. territory can be viewed as the medium, the spatial realm, 
in which the state exercises its control. thus, when the eCthr speaks of jurisdiction 
under Article 1 being primarily territorial, as it often does,28 it should be understood 
24  Convention for the Protection of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, e.t.s. 
5, Art. 1. Michael O’Boyle, The European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: 
A Comment on “Life After Bankovic” in Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties 125 
(F. Coomans & M.t. kamminga (eds.), Antwerp: intersentia, 2004); Marko Milanovic & tatjana Papic, 
As Bad as It Gets: The European Court of Human Rights’s “Behrami and Saramati” Decision and General 
International Law, 58(2) international & Comparative Law Quarterly 267, 272 (2009); ralph wilde, Legal 
“Black Hole”? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights, 26(3) 
Michigan Journal of international Law 739, 797–798 (2005).
25  Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Application No. 48787/99, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 8 July 
2004, para. 312; Marko Milanovic, From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Juris-
diction in Human Rights Treaties, 8 human rights Law review 411, 415 (2008).
26  Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 109 (7th ed., New york: routledge, 
1997).
27  Lassa Oppenheim et al., Oppenheim’s International Law. Vol. 1: Peace. Parts 2–4 458 (harlow: Longman, 
1992); ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 299 (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2008); 
Antonio Cassese, International Law 50 (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2005); For a full explanation 
of what each type of jurisdiction entails see Malcolm shaw, International Law 649–651 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2008).
28  See, for example, Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, Application No. 52207/99, decision (Grand 
Chamber), 12 december 2001, para. 61; Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber), 23 February 2012, para. 71; Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25, 
para. 312; Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 131.
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that possession of territory is a natural condition of statehood and territory is the 
spatial realm in which the state’s jurisdiction/control is principally manifested.
using de facto control as an indicator of the exercise of jurisdiction has been 
a consistent characteristic of the european Court, and its forebear the european 
Commission on human rights, for decades. Conceptualising jurisdiction in this 
manner is both consistent with the practice of other international human rights 
bodies and is potentially the most human rights-friendly approach available to the 
eCthr. For instance, the uN Convention Against torture has been interpreted to apply 
to “all areas where the state party exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, 
de jure or de facto effective control.”29 similarly, obligations arising from the iCCPr 
have been interpreted to extend to all individuals “within the power or effective 
control” of a state.30 in theory at least, such an approach recognises individuals within 
the Convention’s protection at times when they are most vulnerable to the power 
of the state, as that state, through its agents, is exercising control over either them 
or the territory in which they are located.
Loizidou v. Turkey31 is an example of the eCthr’s approach to de facto control over 
territory. in this landmark case, the applicant owned property in Northern Cyprus 
and was prevented from accessing it following the turkish invasion of Cyprus and the 
de facto partition of the island. she alleged that turkey was responsible for denying 
her peaceful enjoyment of her property. the eCthr had to decide whether territory 
in Northern Cyprus, which was occupied by turkey since the 1970s, came within 
the jurisdiction of turkey for the purposes of Article 1. when deciding the issue of 
jurisdiction, the eCthr outlined its approach to what has been widely referred to as 
spatial jurisdiction.32 it stated that
the responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a con-
sequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises effective 
control of an area outside its national territory. the obligation to secure, in 
such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from 
29  uN Committee Against torture (CAt), General Comment No. 2: implementation of Article 2 by states 
Parties, 24 January 2008, CAt/C/GC/2, para. 16.
30  uN human rights Committee (hrC), General Comment No. 31 [80], the Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation imposed on states Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPr/C/21/rev.1/Add.13, 
para. 10.
31  Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Application No. 15318/89, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 
23 March 1995.
32  See, for example, Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23(1) european Journal of 
international Law 121, 122 (2012); ralph wilde, The Extraterritorial Application of International Human 
Rights Law on Civil and Political Rights in Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law 635, 
641 (s. sheeran & N. rodley (eds.), Abingdon, uk: routledge, 2013); Lea raible, The Extraterritoriality 
of the ECHR: Why Jaloud and Pisari Should Be Read as Game Changers, 2 european human rights Law 
review 161, 163 (2016).
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the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, through its armed 
forces, or through a subordinate local administration.33
there are several noteworthy elements in this statement. Firstly, the eCthr refers 
to effective control of “an area” e.g. piece of territory as opposed to individual people. 
secondly, the eCthr does not specify that the state’s obligation is only to secure 
certain rights, it refers to the rights and freedoms in general, implying that the state 
must guarantee all of the rights and freedoms in the Convention.34 the eCthr later 
confirms this in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey when it states
having effective overall control over Northern Cyprus […] turkey’s 
“jurisdiction” must be considered to extend to securing the entire range of 
substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols 
which she has ratified.35
interestingly the eCthr makes no direct mention of the procedural obligations 
here. however, it has since applied the procedural obligations in Article 2, which 
demand investigation of suspicious deaths, extra-territorially in the cases of Jaloud 
v. Netherlands36 and Al-Skeini v. UK,37 so one can assume that they must also be 
guaranteed. these cases are discussed in detail below. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the eCthr refers to the obligation to secure the rights deriving from the 
fact that turkey is exercising control over the territory. thus, the factual control that 
turkey exercised over territory was crucial in determining that jurisdiction arose.
A similar emphasis on de facto control is evident with the so-called “personal 
jurisdiction” approach.38 in one of the earliest forays into the application of human 
rights during extra-territorial armed conflicts, also involving the situation in Northern 
Cyprus, the european Commission on human rights stated that “authorised agents 
of turkey […] bring any other persons or property in Cyprus ‘within the jurisdiction’ 
of turkey, in the sense of Article 1 of the Convention, to the extent that they exercise 
control over such persons or property.”39 this de facto control approach has been 
33  Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), supra note 31, para. 62.
34  Noam Lubell, Human Rights Obligations in Military Occupation, 94(885) international review of the 
red Cross 317, 320 (2012).
35  Cyprus v. Turkey, Application No. 25781/94, Judgment, 10 May 2001, para. 77.
36  Jaloud v. Netherlands, Application No. 47708/08, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 20 November 2014.
37  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18.
38  See, for example, Cedric ryngaert, Clarifying the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, 28(74) utrecht Journal of international and european Law 57, 59 (2012); Marko 
Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy 173 (Oxford: 
Oxford university Press, 2011).
39  Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 17, para. 10.
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applied subsequently in numerous decisions, largely relating to instances when an 
individual is brought within the custody of a Contracting Party to the Convention.40 
thus, the eCthr contends that de facto control is the decisive factor in determining 
the existence of both of these types of jurisdiction under the eChr.41
As will be demonstrated in our analysis of the situation in ukraine below, the 
problem lies not with the conception of jurisdiction in terms of de facto control, 
but rather with the chronically indecisive and inconsistent approach the eCthr has 
taken to interpreting and applying de facto control in cases involving violations of 
the Convention in both domestic and foreign armed conflicts.
2. The Crimean “Annexation”
shortly after viktor yanukovych fled ukraine in February 2014, pro-russian 
gunmen took control of key government buildings in Crimea.42 Over the following 
weeks, russian forces based in sevastopol, supported by troops from the russian 
mainland, took control of the entire Crimean Peninsula. A referendum was then held 
on 16 March on whether Crimea should become part of russia, which was passed.43 
the territory was formally annexed by russia through the treaty on Accession of 
the republic of Crimea to russia,44 which was followed by a domestic legal act of 
the russian state. the “annexation” of the Crimean Peninsula gives rise to a very 
important question – who is now responsible for protecting human rights in this 
territory, ukraine, russia or do they each have obligations to uphold?
Before discussing this further, it is important to clear up the difference between 
belligerent occupation and annexation, which is of crucial importance. under ihL, 
territory is considered occupied when it is placed under the authority of the hostile 
army and the occupation extends only to the territory where its authority has been 
established and can be exercised.45 Belligerent occupation is considered a transient 
40  See, for example, Öcalan v. Turkey (Merits), Application No. 46221/99, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 
12 May 2005, para. 91; Freda v. Italy, Application No. 8916/80, decision, 7 October 1980.
41  As opposed to the exercise of legal authority. See on this Mirja trilsch & Alexandra ruth, Bankovic v. 
Belgium, 97 American Journal of international Law 168, 171 (2003) and Nehal C. Bhuta, Conflicting 
International Obligations and the Risk of Torture and Unfair Trial: Critical Comments on R (Al-Saadoon 
and Mufdhi) v. Secretary of State for Defence and Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, 7(5) Journal 
of international Criminal Justice 1133, 1138 (2009).
42  ukraine Crisis: timeline, supra note 4.
43  Crimea referendum: voters Back russia union, BBC News, 16 March 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26606097.
44  A treaty between the russian Federation and the republic of Crimea on the Accession of the republic 
of Crimea to the russian Federation and on Forming New Constituent entities within the russian 
Federation, russian Federation-republic of Crimea, 18 March 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://
en.wikisource.org/wiki/treaty_on_the_Accession_of_the_republic_of_Crimea_to_russia.
45  hague Convention (iv) respecting the Laws and Customs of war on Land and its Annex: regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of war on Land, 18 October 1907, 205 C.t.s. 277, Art. 42.
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status under international law with the occupier bound to respect the existing laws 
in force within the territory “unless absolutely prevented” from doing so.46 As Carcano 
notes, this limitation on the occupying power protects the separate existence of 
the state, its institutions and its laws and constitutes a critical boundary between 
occupation and annexation.47 the fate of occupied territory is typically determined 
by a peace treaty once the conflict between the parties is resolved.48 By contrast 
annexation describes a domestic legal act of a state purporting to extend sovereignty 
over a piece of territory over which it has gained effective control through non-
consensual, forcible means.49
the exact status of the territory, annexed or occupied, could have a considerable 
impact in determining which state is responsible for human rights protection within 
a territory. the situation in Crimea has prompted human rights claims against both 
russia and ukraine at the eCthr and documents issued by the court state that 
approximately 4,000 individual applications relating to the events in both Crimea and 
eastern ukraine have been submitted.50 Notably, as well as applications being lodged 
solely against ukraine or russia, a number of have been lodged against both states.51 
46  hague Convention (iv) respecting the Laws and Customs of war on Land and its Annex: regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of war on Land, Art. 43. See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of victims of international Armed Conflicts, 
8 June 1977, 1125 u.N.t.s. 3, Art. 4, which states “neither the occupation of a territory nor the application 
of the Conventions and this Protocol shall affect the legal status of the territory in question.” For an 
interesting analysis of the genesis of this rule see eyal Benvenisti, The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent 
Occupation, 26(3) Law and history review 621, 648 (2008).
47  Andrea Carcano, The Transformation of Occupied Territory in International Law 24 (Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff, 2015).
48  Id. at 19; this approach is also mentioned by the eCthr in Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, 
supra note 18, para. 89.
49  daniel Costelloe, Treaty Succession in Annexed Territory, 65(2) international & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 343, 353 (2016); As Fox notes – An assertion of de jure authority through annexation is 
fundamentally at odds with the temporary nature of occupation – Gregory h. Fox, The Occupation of 
Iraq, 36 Georgetown Journal of international Law 195, 298 (2004–2005).
50  european Court of human rights, Press Country Profile – ukraine (July 2018) (Aug. 2, 2018), available 
at https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/CP_ukraine_eNG.pdf.
51  european Court of human rights, Press Country Profile – russia (July 2018), at 16 (Aug. 2, 2018), available
at http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/CP_russia_eNG.pdf. Cases from the east of ukraine concerning 
destruction of property as a result of shelling have been brought against both russia and ukraine, see 
Lisnyy v. Ukraine and Russia, Application No. 44913/15, Judgment (section i), 5 July 2016. indeed ukraine 
itself has launched an inter-state complaint against russia concerning the annexation of Crimea, which 
is currently pending before the eCthr – Ukraine v. Russia (Application No. 20958/14) – see european 
Court of human rights, european Court of human rights Communicates to russia New inter-state Case 
Concerning events in Crimea and eastern ukraine, 1 October 2015 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf?library=eChr&id=003-5187816-6420666&filename=eChr%20
communicates%20new%20inter-state%20case%20concerning%20events%20in%20Crimea%20
and%20eastern%20ukraine.pdf; for more analysis of the inter-state case see koch 2016 and stefan 
kirchner, Interim Measures in Inter-State Proceedings Before the European Court of Human Rights: Ukraine 
v. Russia, 3(1) university of Baltimore Journal of international Law 33 (2015).
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the fact that these applications have been lodged against both ukraine and russia 
and against each state individually indicates that the duty bearer for human rights 
obligations in Crimea remains unclear. two potential scenarios emerge in respect of 
the situation in Crimea.
2.1. Scenario 1 – Crimea Has Been Annexed
the first scenario assumes that russia’s annexation of Crimea is legitimate, and 
Crimea now forms part of its territory. if this were the case, the responsibility of both 
russia and ukraine for human rights protection in Crimea would be relatively clear.
2.1.1. Russia’s Responsibility for Human Rights
in order for state responsibility to arise under international law, the conduct 
consisting of an action or omission must be (a) attributable to the state under 
international law and (b) it must constitute a breach of the state’s international 
obligations.52 Before a state can breach an obligation, the obligation must first be 
owed.53 in the context of the Convention, this means that the applicant must, generally 
speaking, be within the state’s jurisdiction before attribution is determined and state 
responsibility held to arise.54 if Crimea is now de jure part of russian territory, russia 
would be presumed to exercise jurisdiction over this region for the purposes of Article 1 
of the eChr.55 this presumption is rebuttable, but it is difficult to rebut in practice.56
state responsibility may not arise for every act/omission that occurs within a state’s 
jurisdiction. the state may not be held responsible for the acts of private actors, 
because those acts may not be attributable to it.57 equally, acts that are attributable 
to the state may not give rise to state responsibility where the state does not owe 
obligations to the victims under international law, which is contingent on the exercise 
52  James Crawford, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries, 2 yearbook of the international Law Commission 1, 34 (2001).
53  samantha Besson, The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human 
Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts To, 25(4) Leiden Journal of international 
Law 857, 867 (2012); O’Boyle 2004, at 130.
54  Crawford 2001, at 35; Milanovic 2008, at 437; occasionally the Court may be required to determine 
whether the acts of particular soldiers are attributable to the state first before considering the issue 
of control, see Milanovic & Papic 2009, at 273.
55  Assanidze v. Georgia, Application No. 71503/01, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 8 April 2004, para. 139, 
the eCthr here uses the term competence interchangeably with jurisdiction in this case in para. 137. 
See also koch 2016, at 184–185.
56  this is in part down to the international legal principle of territorial integrity see Marcelo G. kohen, 
Secession: International Law Perspectives 369 (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2006) and 
enrico Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law – Reconciling Effectiveness, Legality 
and Legitimacy 123–125 (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
57  James Crawford & simon Olleson, The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility in International 
Law in International Law 441, 454 (M.d. evans (ed.), 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2010).
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of jurisdiction. determining the issue of attribution of conduct to russia would also 
be more straightforward in this scenario. the situation in Crimea is different from 
other secessionist entities in europe such as the Moldovan republic of transdniestria 
(Mrt) or the turkish republic of Northern Cyprus (trNC). those entities have declared 
independence and been supported by another state, russia and turkey respectively, 
however their independence has not been broadly recognised by the international 
community. this has led to problems with determining who is responsible for 
protecting human rights within these territories. the supporting states, russia and 
turkey, regularly claim that the actions of the secessionist entities cannot be attributed 
to russia and turkey as they are independent.58 the eCthr has often bypassed this issue 
by ruling that it is not necessary that the supporting state “actually exercises detailed 
control over the policies and actions” of the authorities of the secessionist entity,59 what 
matters is that the supporting states exercise effective authority or at the very least 
have a decisive influence over the secessionist entity which “survives by virtue of the 
military, economic, financial and political support given to it’ by the supporting state.”60 
where the supporting state does this, the actions of the secessionist entity will be 
attributed to the supporting state with the eCthr effectively equating the authorities 
of the secessionist entity with de facto organs or agents of the supporting state for 
whose acts it may generally be held responsible.61
this fraught situation would be avoided in the context of Crimea because, 
as russia expressly claims that Crimea is now part of its territory, attributing the 
conduct of the agents operating there to russia is not problematic. in sum, if 
Crimea is genuinely part of the russian Federation now, the issues of jurisdiction 
and attribution concerning that state are relatively clear cut.
58  Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Applications No. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber), 19 October 2012, paras. 96–101; Mozer v. Moldova and Russia, Application 
No. 11138/10, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 23 February 2016, paras. 92–95; Loizidou v. Turkey 
(Preliminary Objections), supra note 31, para. 54; Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 35, para. 69.
59  Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), supra note 31, para. 56; Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 
supra note 58, paras. 106 and 150; Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25, para. 315; 
Mozer v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 58, para. 157.
60  Mozer v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 58, para. 157; Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 35, para. 77; Ilaşcu 
and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25, paras. 316 and 392; Catan and Others v. Moldova and 
Russia, supra note 58, para. 150.
61  stefan talmon, The Responsibility of Outside Powers for Acts of Secessionist Entities, 58(3) international & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 493, 510–511 (2009); Marek szydło, Extra-Territorial Application of the 
European Convention on Human Rights After Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda, 12(1) international Criminal Law 
review 271, 281 (2012). the european Commission made a statement on responsibility for de facto 
state agents in Stocke v. Germany, Application No. 11755/85, Judgment, 19 March 1991: “in the case 
of collusion between state authorities, i.e. any state official irrespective of his hierarchical position, 
and a private individual for the purpose of returning against his will a person living abroad, without 
consent of his state of residence, to its territory where he is prosecuted, the high Contracting Party 
concerned incurs responsibility for the acts of the private individual who de facto acts on its behalf.”
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2.1.2. Ukraine’s Responsibility for Human Rights
in the document the ukrainian government sent to the secretary General of 
the Council of europe derogating from the Convention in light of the crisis, the 
government made a statement concerning human rights responsibility in Crimea. 
it declared that
due to the annexation and temporary occupation by the russian 
Federation of the integral part of ukraine – the Autonomous republic of 
Crimea and the city of sevastopol – as a result of armed aggression against 
ukraine, the russian Federation is fully responsible for respect for human 
rights and implementation of the relevant treaties in annexed and temporary 
occupied territory of ukraine.62
the statement is confusing and contradictory. the ukrainian government 
specifically refers to the Autonomous republic of Crimea and the city of sevastopol 
and makes two conflicting claims, that russia has annexed this territory and that 
it is engaged in a “temporary occupation.” ukraine then claims that russia is “fully 
responsible” for upholding human rights protection in Crimea. Factually speaking 
both situations, temporary occupation and annexation depend on the exercise of 
effective control so there is no issue in that regard. the confusion arises from ukraine’s 
acknowledgement of annexation and the legal consequences (russia’s responsibility 
for human rights) flowing from that. in principle, if the territory is now legally part of 
russia, ukraine should cease to have any legal interest in protecting the rights of the 
population there. the problem is that russia’s annexation has not been internationally 
recognised and there is a strong case to be made that russia’s annexation violates 
international law as territory belonging to a state may not be “the object of acquisition 
by another state resulting from the threat or use of force.”63 in a vote at the uN General 
Assembly on the subject of the territorial integrity of ukraine, the vast majority of the 
states voted in favour of a resolution which stated
the referendum held in the Autonomous republic of Crimea and the city 
of sevastopol on 16 March 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis 
62  ukrainian Government, resolution of the verkhovna rada, supra note 5.
63  united Nations, Charter of the united Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 u.N.t.s. Xvi, Art. 2(4); uN General 
Assembly, declaration on Principles of international Law Concerning Friendly relations and 
Cooperation Among states in Accordance with the Charter of the united Nations, 24 October 1970, 
A/res/2625(XXv); Cassese 2005, at 57; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, supra note 16, at 171–172. roth has described russia’s armed takeover of Crimea 
as an unambiguous violation of international law – Brad roth, The Neglected Virtues of Bright Lines: 
International Law in the 2014 Ukraine Crises, 21(2) iLsA Journal of international & Comparative Law 
317, 317 (2014–2015).
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for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous republic of Crimea or of 
the city of sevastopol.64
it also seems highly unlikely that the eCthr will recognise the legitimacy of 
russia’s annexation, given the widespread view that it violates international law.65 
it could hold russia responsible for upholding some rights within the territory, but 
it does not follow that such a finding implicitly legitimises the “annexation.”66 in 
Demopoulos v. Turkey, for example, the eCthr held that inhabitants of the trNC were 
obliged to exhaust domestic remedies created by the authorities of that territory. 
despite reaching this finding the court expressly stated
the Court maintains its opinion that allowing the respondent state to 
correct wrongs imputable to it does not amount to an indirect legitimisation 
of a regime unlawful under international law.67
64  uN General Assembly, resolution on the territorial integrity of ukraine, 27 March 2014, A/res/68/262. 
See also uN General Assembly, resolution on the situation of human rights in the Autonomous 
republic of Crimea and the City of sevastopol (ukraine), 19 december 2016, A/res/71/205 referring 
to Crimea as temporarily occupied by the russian Federation and refuting any annexation and uN 
General Assembly, resolution on the situation of human rights in the Autonomous republic of 
Crimea and the City of sevastopol, ukraine, 19 december 2017, A/res/72/190 urging russia to comply 
with its obligations as an occupying power.
65  the Council of europe, of which the european Court of human rights is a part, issued a resolution 
through its Parliamentary Assembly stating “the illegal annexation of Crimea by the russian Federation 
[has] no legal effect and [is] not recognised by the Council of europe” – see Parliamentary Assembly 
of Council of europe, resolution 1988 (2014) (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/
xml/Xref/Xref-XML2htML-en.asp?fileid=20873&lang=en. Another Council of europe body issued 
an opinion on the legality of russia’s moves to annex Crimea stating that it amounted to a violation 
of international law – see european Commission for democracy through Law, Opinion on “whether 
draft Federal Constitutional Law No. 462741-6 on Amending the Federal Constitutional Law of 
the russian Federation on the Procedure of Admission to the russian Federation and Creation of 
a New subject within the russian Federation is Compatible with international Law,” 21 March 2014, 
CdL-Ad(2014)004, paras. 39 and 46. See also thomas Grant, Aggression Against Ukraine Territory, 
Responsibility, and International Law (New york: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
66  thomas Grant, Crimea After Cyprus v. Turkey: Just Satisfaction for Unlawful Annexation?, eJiL: talk!, 19 May 
2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-after-cyprus-v-turkey-just-satisfaction-
for-unlawful-annexation. the iCJ has held in the past that even if the legitimacy of the administration 
of a territory is not recognized by the international community, international law can nonetheless 
recognise the legitimacy of certain acts such as the registration of births, deaths and marriages. the iCJ’s 
primary concern here was for the welfare of the inhabitants of the territory to avoid detrimental effects of 
occupation – see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 i.C.J. 16, 56.
67  Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey, Applications No. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 
14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04, decision (Grand Chamber), 1 March 2010, para. 96. A former judge 
at the eCthr, Loukis Loucaides, was extremely critical of this decision arguing that the eCthr should 
not apply the Namibia judgment to human rights remedies in the trNC – see Loukis Loucaides, Is the 
European Court of Human Rights Still a Principled Court of Human Rights After the Demopoulos Case?, 
24(2) Leiden Journal of international Law 435, 446 (2011).
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thus, from a legal standpoint, the international community considers that Crimea 
remains a part of ukraine and therefore ukraine’s treaty obligations are presumed 
to extend to this territory, which includes the eChr.68
2.2. Scenario 2 – Crimea is “Occupied” by Russia
if the annexation is illegitimate, it means that russia has not permanently 
displaced ukraine’s sovereign power over Crimea and the territory is instead subject 
to a temporary belligerent occupation. in these circumstances, the human rights 
obligations of both russia and ukraine are much less clear.
2.2.1. Russia’s Responsibility for Human Rights
the eCthr has stated on several occasions that where states exercise control 
over foreign territory they can be held responsible for guaranteeing human rights 
protection there. in Assanidze v. Georgia, the eCthr stated that
in addition to the state territory proper, territorial jurisdiction extends 
to any area which, at the time of the alleged violation, is under the “overall 
control” of the state concerned […] notably occupied territories.69
the eCthr made similar statements in the case of Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom noting
where the territory of one Convention state is occupied by the armed forces 
of another, the occupying state should in principle be held accountable under 
the Convention for breaches of human rights within the occupied territory.70
the iCJ has also made similar pronouncements in its opinion on the Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Uganda case when it stated
ihrL instruments are applicable in respect of acts done by a state in the 
exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory, particularly in occupied 
territories.71
68  Costelloe 2016, at 373.
69  Assanidze v. Georgia, supra note 55, para. 138. the eCthr made a similar observation in Sargsyan v. 
Azerbaijan, Application No. 40167/06, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 16 June 2015, para. 94, noting 
that “the requirement of actual authority [for belligerent occupation] is widely considered to be 
synonymous to that of effective control [for extra-territorial jurisdiction].”
70  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 142.
71  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, supra note 16, at 242–243. See also Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 16, at 180.
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the issue here is not in determining that russia is liable in principle,72 but rather 
in determining the extent of russia’s liability. the nature of the state’s jurisdiction is 
crucial to determining the extent of its human rights obligations under the eChr. this 
is because the eCthr holds the state to different standards depending on whether 
spatial jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction exists. if spatial jurisdiction is found, the 
eCthr requires that the state guarantee all the rights in the Convention,73 whereas if 
personal jurisdiction is found, the eCthr only requires that the rights that are relevant 
to the situation be protected.74 the jurisprudence on this subject is further complicated 
by the fact that the eCthr does not test whether spatial jurisdiction exists consistently. 
Obvious inconsistencies become apparent when you compare the seminal case of 
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom with the more recent case of Chiragov v. Armenia.75
Before delving into this comparison, a few observations about the parallels 
between spatial jurisdiction and belligerent occupation should be made. Firstly, 
occupied territory is placed under the authority of a hostile army and the 
occupation only extends to the territory where this authority is established and 
can be exercised.76 spatial jurisdiction arises where, as a consequence of military 
action, a contracting state exercises effective control of an area outside its national 
territory.77 the parallels here are very obvious: both rely on the de facto exercise of 
control/authority outside the normal territory of a state and as such belligerent 
occupation should automatically give rise to spatial jurisdiction.78 secondly, the 
eCthr has stated that when determining whether spatial jurisdiction exists, the 
primary indicator is the strength of state’s military presence in the area.79 secondary 
indicators it will consider include the “extent to which its military, economic and 
political support for the local subordinate administration provides it with influence 
and control over the region.”80
the overlaps between belligerent occupation and spatial jurisdiction are such 
that, when a state is in belligerent occupation of a territory, one would expect that 
the eCthr will at least test whether spatial jurisdiction exists. with spatial jurisdiction 
72  koch 2016, at 179–180.
73  See, inter alia, Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 58, para. 106.
74  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 138.
75  Chiragov v. Armenia, Application No. 13216/05, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 16 June 2015.
76  hague Convention (iv) respecting the Laws and Customs of war on Land and its Annex: regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of war on Land, Art. 42.
77  Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), supra note 31, para. 62.
78  Lubell 2012, at 273.
79  Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), supra note 31, paras. 16 and 56; Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova 
and Russia, supra note 25, para. 387.
80  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25, paras. 388–394.
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offering much greater protection to the inhabitants of the occupied territory, 
requiring the occupier to guarantee both the positive and negative human rights 
obligations owed to the applicant or their relatives, its sensible that the eCthr would 
conduct such an evaluation rather than default to the lower level of protection 
offered where the jurisdictional link is personal. despite this, the trend at the eCthr 
has been to apply the spatial jurisdiction test only to cases of prolonged occupation/
de facto annexation.81
the inconsistencies in the eCthr’s approach are evident in the Al-Skeini v. United 
Kingdom case.82 in that case, six iraqi civilians took legal action against the uk. they 
were all relatives of people who had died in iraq between May and November 2003 
while the uk was in belligerent occupation of Basrah. the uk’s soldiers were involved 
to varying degrees in the deaths and their relatives claimed that the uk had an 
obligation to investigate them.83 Given that the territory was subject to belligerent 
occupation, one would have expected the eCthr to find that the uk was exercising 
spatial jurisdiction over the territory and obliged them to uphold all the eChr rights. 
however, the uk government denied that the Convention applied to the occupied 
territory throughout the litigation. domestically, the english Court of Appeal 
ruled that the uk was not exercising effective territorial control over Basrah, even 
though it was the recognised belligerent occupier there under a uN security Council 
resolution.84 in its decision, the Court of Appeal drew comparisons between turkish 
control over the trNC (a case of prolonged occupation/de facto annexation) and uk 
control over Basrah. the court considered that turkey intended to exercise control 
over the trNC on a long-term basis, turkey controlled the civilian administration 
there and had deployed sufficient troops to ensure effective control. By contrast the 
provisional authority governing iraq was dominated by American personnel and was 
“in no sense a subordinate organ or instrument of the uk,”85 there were not enough 
81  See, for example, the trNC in Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), supra note 31, the Moldovan 
republic of transdniestria in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25 and Nagorno-
karabakh in Chiragov v. Armenia, supra note 75.
82  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18.
83  when an individual has been killed as a result of the use of force by a state agent, the Convention 
demands some form of effective official investigation – McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, 
Application No. 18984/91, Judgment, 27 september 1995, para. 161.
84  the uk and us were recognised as belligerent occupiers in uN security Council, resolution 1483 
(2003), 22 May 2003, s/res/1483. while this statement has normative power, the fact that occupation 
is determined by factual control, which changes over time, arguably casts doubt on this statement. 
the court’s view that the eChr did not apply to the occupied territory was later upheld by the house 
of Lords – R. (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] ukhL 26, para. 83.
85  R. (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2005] ewCA Civ 1609, para. 118. the uNsCr also specifically 
noted that the occupiers were “under unified command” and if the court’s finding here were taken to its 
logical conclusion the simple fact of being in a military coalition would mean all occupiers could avoid their 
responsibilities by claiming they lack exclusive control over the authority administering the territory.
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troops to secure effective control,86 and the uk intended to transfer responsibility 
to iraqi authorities as soon as possible.87 the court denied that holding the status 
of belligerent occupier equated to effective control stating that “it is a feature of 
strasbourg jurisprudence that the court will examine the facts of each particular 
case to see if the requisite control is in fact exercised.”88
in practice the eCthr has been very inconsistent in its approach to testing the 
issue of spatial jurisdiction and Al-Skeini offers a potent illustration of this. when the 
arguments over jurisdiction raised domestically in Al-Skeini came before the eCthr, 
it did not even examine whether the uk was exercising spatial jurisdiction. in its 
judgment, the eCthr expressly stated
Another exception to the principle that jurisdiction under Art. 1 is limited 
to a state’s own territory occurs when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful 
military action, a contracting state exercises effective control of an area 
outside that national territory [in such circumstances the state must secure] 
the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention.89
this paragraph clearly encompasses situations of belligerent occupation and 
the eCthr later expressly notes that “the united states and the united kingdom 
became occupying powers” in iraq at the relevant time.90 it also acknowledged that 
they “exercise[d] powers of government temporarily” in iraq.91 however, the eCthr 
did not examine whether the uk was exercising spatial jurisdiction in iraq.
instead, the eCthr modified the rules on personal jurisdiction. Previously, the eCthr 
had tended to find personal jurisdiction exclusively on the basis of the connection 
between a state agent and the victim, such as being in the agent’s custody.92 the 
eCthr denied the possibility that jurisdictional links could arise from instantaneous 
86  R. (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence, supra note 85, para. 121. the judgment is contradictory 
on this point, the inability to secure effective control amounts to an admission that the uk was 
not a belligerent occupier of the territory, but this is expressly contradicted in other parts of the 
judgment see, for example, [12] and [124]. As Milanovic notes, “a belligerent occupation without 
effective control… is simply no longer an occupation.” Milanović 2011, at 146.
87  R. (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence, supra note 85, para. 116. this final statement should not 
have any legal weight as all belligerent occupations should be transient, see Carcano 2015, at 22–26 
and also Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 89. the transient nature of the 
occupation should not be used to cast doubt on its existence, if the eCthr was prepared to consider 
that turkey exercised temporary de facto control over a section of iraqi territory in Issa and Others v. 
Turkey, Application No. 31821/96, Judgment (section ii), 16 November 2004, para. 74, the uk’s presence 
in iraq could certainly have amounted to spatial control over territory.
88  R. (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence, supra note 85, para. 127.
89  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 138.
90  Id. para. 143.
91  Id. para. 144.
92  See, for example, Öcalan v. Turkey (Merits), supra note 40.
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extra-territorial acts of state agents, such as firing missiles that killed civilians.93 in 
Al-Skeini, the eCthr broadened this considerably in stating that jurisdiction arises 
when a contracting state “exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be 
exercised [by the government of the state],”94 and within that context, instantaneous 
acts may give rise to jurisdictional links to the state. this finding added a layer of 
governmental operations to a test which had previously been concerned with 
individual connections. the eCthr applied this model, which is referred to hereinafter 
as “personal plus jurisdiction,” in Al-Skeini and held that instantaneous acts of uk 
soldiers, such as shootings, automatically created a jurisdictional link to the state
the united kingdom, through its soldiers engaged in security operations 
in Basrah during the period in question, exercised authority and control over 
individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish 
a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the united kingdom for the 
purposes of Art. 1 of the Convention.95 (emphasis added)
As illustrated below, the key difference between this model and standard 
personal jurisdiction is that where the state is exercising some public powers, the 
eCthr treats the power to kill and the instantaneous act of doing so as “authority and 
control” over the individual.96 so under this conception of the law, the invading state 
is not obliged to uphold all of the rights under the Convention for the people in the 
invaded territory, but must secure the rights and freedoms under the Convention 
that are relevant to the situation of each individual over which the state exercises 
control and authority.97 Lubell has described the court’s approach here as “a badly 
mixed cocktail, unsuccessfully attempting to fuse concepts of control over the 
territory with the question of state agent authority.”98
the approach in Al-Skeini contrasts sharply with the eCthr’s more recent approach 
in Chiragov v. Armenia.99 that case concerned the district of Lachin, which became part 
of Azerbaijan’s territory after the collapse of the union of soviet socialist republics 
(ussr).100 Armenia and Azerbaijan went to war in the early 90s over the region of 
93  Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, supra note 28.
94  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 135.
95  Id. para. 149.
96  Mads Andenas & eirik Bjorge, Human Rights and Acts by Troops Abroad: Rights and Jurisdictional 
Restrictions, 18(3) european Public Law 473, 480 (2012).
97  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 137.
98  Lubell 2012, at 321.
99  Chiragov v. Armenia, supra note 75.
100  Minsk Agreement establishing the Commonwealth of independent states, 8 december 1991, Art. 5 
states: “the high Contracting Parties acknowledge and respect each other’s territorial integrity and 
the inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth.” Both Azerbaijan and Armenia signed 
the treaty on 21 december 1991.
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Nagorno-karabakh, where Lachin is situated. According to the eCthr, by the end of 
1993 ethnic Armenian forces had gained control over almost the entire territory of 
Nagorno-karabakh, including Lachin.101 the applicants were displaced by the conflict 
and brought a case against Armenia inter alia for the loss of peaceful enjoyment 
of possessions. the eCthr accepted, as it did previously with turkey and the trNC, 
that the self-proclaimed Nagorno-karabakh republic would not exist without the 
support of Armenia.102 thus, the eCthr concluded that Armenia was heavily implicated 
in the belligerent occupation of territory, which de jure belonged to Azerbaijan. the 
difference in approach between this case and Al-Skeini is stark as the eCthr states
the Court first considers that the situation pertaining in Nagorno-karabakh 
and the surrounding territories is not one of Armenian state agents exercising 
authority and control over individuals abroad, as alternatively argued by 
the applicants. instead, the issue to be determined on the facts of the case 
is whether the republic of Armenia exercised and continues to exercise 
effective control over the mentioned territories and as a result may be held 
responsible for the alleged violations […] to determine whether Armenia 
has jurisdiction in the present case, it is thus necessary to assess whether 
it exercises effective control over Nagorno-karabakh and the surrounding 
territories as a whole.103
the eCthr completely discounts the possibility of personal jurisdiction and 
assumes that spatial jurisdiction exists in this context. it is not at all clear why the 
eCthr should treat these comparable situations of the armed forces of one state 
entering the territory of another state so differently and why the eCthr should 
examine whether spatial jurisdiction exists in one case, but not the other. One possible 
explanation is that spatial jurisdiction is limited to existing contracting states, though 
the eCthr has never acknowledged this to be the case. the eCthr has shown a desire 
to avoid gaps in protection in areas currently subject to the Convention’s protection 
and such a limitation would be consistent with that approach.104 however, it has also 
entertained the possibility of spatial jurisdiction existing temporarily in another non-
contracting state,105 and discounted the idea of there being a limited “legal space” in 
which the Convention operates.106
101  Chiragov v. Armenia, supra note 75, para. 174.
102  Id. paras. 172–180.
103  Id. paras. 169–170.
104  Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, supra note 69, para. 148.
105  Issa and Others v. Turkey, supra note 87, para. 74.
106  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 142.
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Another possible explanation for the difference in treatment is provided by 
Giacca who has argued, in the context of economic, social and cultural rights, that 
a contextual approach should be taken in which “varying levels of obligations” attach 
to a state “depending on the degree of control exercised in the territory,” thus the 
effectiveness of occupation becomes the determining factor.107 this perhaps explains 
what the Court of Appeal and later the eCthr were meandering toward in Al-Skeini 
and it also offers a tempting compromise. under this approach, as the insurgency 
in iraq undermined the effectiveness of the uk’s occupation it should have led to 
fewer obligations being imposed on the uk. Although appealing, the uncertainty 
this would create over the scope and nature of the applicable obligations is deeply 
undesirable, especially when states would be asking soldiers in the field to uphold 
these obligations, which some would contend is already too onerous a burden. 
Furthermore, even if this is the eCthr’s position, it should not preclude the Court 
from testing whether spatial jurisdiction exists.
the eCthr does not explain why it failed to examine whether spatial jurisdiction 
existed in Al-Skeini and its rationale only becomes apparent in the later iraq case of 
Hassan v. United Kingdom.108 in that case, the uk tried to deny that a detainee it had 
captured was within its jurisdiction because he was detained in a us-run facility and 
therefore the uk did not exercise total and exclusive control over him.109 the eCthr 
makes some revealing statements about its approach in Al-Skeini, essentially taking 
the position that because jurisdiction was found on a personal basis there
it was unnecessary to determine whether jurisdiction also arose on the 
ground that the united kingdom was in effective military control of south 
east iraq during that period.110
despite noting that the alleged violation in Hassan took place earlier, during the 
active hostilities phase of the conflict, the Court adopted the same approach
as in Al-Skeini, the Court does not find it necessary to decide whether 
the united kingdom was in effective control of the area during the relevant 
period, because it finds that the united kingdom exercised jurisdiction over 
tarek hassan on another ground.111
107  Gilles Giacca, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict 161 (Oxford: Oxford university 
Press, 2014).
108  Hassan v. United Kingdom, supra note 14.
109  Id. para. 72.
110  Id. para. 75.
111  Id.
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the eCthr therefore claims it is not necessary to test for spatial jurisdiction when 
another basis for jurisdiction is apparent. however, another basis for jurisdiction 
was not clearly apparent in Al-Skeini. the eCthr had to bend the rules on personal 
jurisdiction to generate a jurisdictional link to some of the applicants in Al-Skeini. the 
bending of rules is clear if one of the applicants from Al-Skeini is examined more closely. 
Mr hameed Abdul rida Awaid kareem’s wife was fatally wounded when machine gun 
fire from outside their building hit their dining room. the uk claimed their soldiers 
were involved in a firefight with unknown gunmen and the applicant’s wife was not 
the primary target.112 As noted above, the eCthr famously ruled that instantaneous 
acts, such as firing a missile from a plane, will not give rise personal jurisdiction over 
the individual hit by the missile.113 it is difficult to see how personal jurisdiction was 
“readily apparent” to the eCthr in the case of Mrs kareem when the eCthr had denied 
that such jurisdictional links could be created by instantaneous acts in the past.
so where does this leave russia’s responsibilities in Crimea if it is in belligerent 
occupation of the territory? russia clearly satisfies the criteria for exercising effective 
control over the territory, it has deployed many troops, enough to prevent or at the 
very least deter ukrainian troops from attempting to re-assert control.114 it also has 
a strong influence on the local administration in Crimea, which is obvious from its 
successful “annexation.” this all points toward russia exercising spatial jurisdiction in 
Crimea, however, there is no guarantee that the eCthr would actually test whether 
russia is exercising spatial jurisdiction in Crimea and its obligations there could 
be similar to those that the eCthr held the uk to in Al-Skeini. thus, the degree of 
responsibility russia bears there remains unclear and this is linked largely to the 
eCthr’s inconsistent approach in testing for spatial jurisdiction.
2.2.2. Is Upholding All Convention Rights in Crimea Feasible?
As spatial jurisdiction would call for all eChr obligations to be guaranteed in 
occupied territory, it is open to question how realistic such a burden would be on 
a state in the context of an occupation or armed conflict. Guaranteeing all of the 
rights in the Convention in the context of on-going military operations presents 
112  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, paras. 43–46.
113  Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, supra note 28, para. 75. the eCthr expressly endorsed 
this conclusion in Medvedyev v. France, Application No. 3394/03, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 
29 March 2010, para. 64. despite some authority that instantaneous acts can create jurisdictional 
links e.g. Andreou v. Turkey, Application No. 45653/99, Judgment (section iv), 27 October 2009, many 
academics view Al-Skeini as re-affirming Bankovic – see, for example, ryngaert 2012, at 59; Anna 
Cowan, A New Watershed? Re-evaluating Bankovic in Light of Al-Skeini, 1(1) Cambridge international 
Law Journal 213, 225 (2012). this issue is discussed further below in the section 4.2.3 “Pro-russian 
rebels exercise Control through instantaneous Acts.”
114  in August 2016 tensions were raised again when russian authorities accused the ukraine of attempted 
incursions into Crimea. russia Accused ukraine of Attempted Crimea incursions, BBC News, 11 August 
2016 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37037401.
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significant obstacles for military forces, which could create an unrealistically onerous 
burden on the state.115 examining the right to life, for example, watkin argues an 
automatic investigation into every use of force by state agents is not feasible and 
that not every death can or should be subject to the exhaustive review process 
normally associated with the application of peacetime human rights norms.116 if 
the obligation is considered excessive when solely applicable to the use of force 
by state agents, it will be even more excessive if the state also has to investigate 
deaths caused by third parties,117 which would be required if the state were found 
to be exercising spatial jurisdiction.
in response many have argued in favour of a functional approach with human 
rights obligations becoming contingent to some degree on the state’s capacity to 
fulfil them.118 the concern is that such an approach generates too much uncertainty in 
the law because the state’s capacity to act may be greater than it realises or is willing 
to pursue for policy reasons and it generally incentivises states to simply ignore 
the law claiming they lack the capacity to enforce it. it is imperative that states can 
identify the applicable obligations ex ante facto, even if the actual burden imposed 
is mitigated in various ways. taking the example of spatial jurisdiction, the default 
position is that all the Convention obligations, positive and negative, substantive 
and procedural are applicable. however, the full force of these obligations can be 
mitigated in a variety of ways.
Firstly, it is likely that states can now derogate from the majority of the provisions 
in the eChr.119 while the practice of Contracting states to the eChr has not been 
to derogate from their obligations under the Convention during various military 
115  Milanović 2011, at 217; konstantinos Mastorodimos, The Utility and Limits of International Human 
Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law’s Parallel Applicability, 5 review of international Law 
and Politics 123, 137 (2009).
116  kenneth watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed 
Conflict, 98(1) American Journal of international Law 1, 32–33 (2004); the Public Commission to 
examine the Maritime incident of 31 May 2010: second report: israel’s Mechanisms for examining 
and investigating Complaints and Claims of violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According 
to international Law (February 2013), at 100–103 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://www.gov.il/
BlobFolder/generalpage/alternatefiles/he/turkel_eng_b1-474_0.pdf.
117  house of Commons defence Committee, uk Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for 
Future Operations: twelfth report of session 2013–14 (March 2013), paras. 24 and 25 (Aug. 2, 2018), 
available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/931/931.pdf.
118  See, for example, Monica hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21(2) european Journal of international 
Law 341, 374–376 (2010); Lawson 2011, at 74–75; yuval shany, Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional 
Approach to Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights Law, 7 Law & ethics of human rights 47 
(2013); Moor and simpson advocate it in the domestic territorial context in Louise Moor & Brian 
simpson, Ghosts of Colonialism in the European Convention on Human Rights, 76(1) British yearbook 
of international Law 121, 125 (2005).
119  No derogation is permitted from Articles 3 (prohibition on torture inhuman and degrading treatment 
or punishment), 4 § 1 (prohibition on slavery) and 7 (prohibition on punishment without law).
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operations at home and overseas,120 the increasingly frequent applications of the 
eChr to extra-territorial military operations give states a powerful incentive to 
derogate.121 the eCthr has taken a very flexible approach to interpreting Article 15 
in practice.122 Logically the capacity to derogate should be commensurate with 
the state’s jurisdiction, thus if a state can be obliged to uphold obligations extra-
territorially, it should also be permitted to derogate from those obligations extra-
territorially.123 the case law coming before the eCthr from conflict situations has 
broadly tended to focus on two particular rights, protection of the right to life124 
and the right to liberty and security.125 the right to liberty and security (Article 5) is 
derogable under the Convention.126 derogation from Article 5 would permit states to 
engage in security detention/internment without having to worry about Article 5 
claims.127 the Article 2 right to life is also derogable to a limited extent. Article 15 
stipulates that states may derogate from Article 2 for lawful acts of war.128 this implies 
120  Hassan v. United Kingdom, supra note 14, para. 101; Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, supra 
note 28, para. 62.
121  the uk has indicated that it intends to derogate from the Convention during future overseas military 
operations – uk Ministry of defence, Government to Protect Armed Forces from Persistent Legal 
Claims in Future Overseas Operations, 4 October 2016 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://www.gov.
uk/government/news/government-to-protect-armed-forces-from-persistent-legal-claims-in-future-
overseas-operations.
122  scott sheeran, Reconceptualizing States of Emergency Under International Human Rights Law: Theory, 
Legal Doctrine, and Politics, 34(3) Michigan Journal of international Law 491, 537 (2013).
123  interestingly in the recent Hassan v. United Kingdom case, the eCthr expressly referred to the right 
of states to derogate from Convention rights before noting the uk had not derogated from the 
Convention while in occupation of iraq. At no point does the eCthr say it is not possible for a state 
to derogate extra-territorially – Hassan v. United Kingdom, supra note 14, para. 98.
124  See, for example, Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18; Jaloud v. Netherlands, supra 
note 36; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, Application No. 61498/08, Judgment (section iv), 
2 March 2010.
125  See, for example, Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, Application No. 27021/08, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 
7 July 2011; Hassan v. United Kingdom, supra note 14; Behrami v. France, supra note 19.
126  Although Allain has argued that the right to liberty and right to a fair trial are non-derogable, and 
as such they now sit beyond the scope of the provisions found in Article 15. Jean Allain, Derogation 
from the European Convention of Human Rights in the Light of “Other Obligations Under International 
Law,” 5 european human rights Law review 480, 480 (2005).
127  derogations from the Convention have historically focused on granting states wider powers to detain 
individuals outside of the strictures of Article 5 – see, for example, Brannigan and McBride v. United 
Kingdom, Applications No. 14553/89, 14554/89, Judgment, 25 May 1993; Aksoy v. Turkey, Application 
No. 21987/93, Judgment, 18 december 1996; A. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 3455/05, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber), 19 February 2009.
128  while the term war naturally implies international armed conflict, there is scope to broaden the 
definition to include non-international armed conflicts, see Joan Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: 
The International System for Protecting Human Rights During States of Emergency 57 (Philadelphia: 
university of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); Louise doswald-Beck, The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: 
Does International Humanitarian Law Provide all the Answers?, 88(864) international review of the 
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first that Article 2 continues to apply during war (armed conflict) and second, that 
when a state derogates, Article 2 continues to have some residual effect on unlawful 
acts of war. if states were to utilise this derogation it would modify the substantive 
obligation in Article 2 so that only unlawful acts of war were penalised and the focus 
of the obligation to investigate would also shift to these infringements alone. these 
unlawful acts of war would be judged against international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law standards. the beauty of this approach is that when Article 2 
is derogated from in this way, it does not impose any additional obligations on the 
state, but facilitates greater enforcement of other obligations on the state.129 the 
Geneva Conventions, for example, are almost universally ratified and demand that 
states search for, try or extradite people who are suspected of committing grave 
breaches of their provisions.130 the majority of contracting states to the Convention 
are also signatories to the rome statute of the international Criminal Court, which 
demands that states investigate and prosecute international crimes, including 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.131 there is also a very strong 
argument that states have a duty under customary international law to investigate 
and prosecute international crimes.132 the latent procedural obligations after the state 
has derogated can be directed toward securing investigation of unlawful acts of war 
and in this manner ihL and human rights law can complement each other with the 
Convention providing an accountability framework for violations of ihL.133
red Cross 881, 882 (2006). For a similar discussion in the context of the American Convention on 
human rights see robert Norris & Paula reiton, The Suspension of Guarantees: A Comparative Analysis 
of the American Convention on Human Rights and the Constitutions of the States Parties, 30 American 
university Law review 189, 195 (1980).
129  As schabas points out, however, the criminal acts under ihL would have to coincide with violations of 
ihrL for the procedural obligation to investigate to arise – william schabas, Synergy or Fragmentation? 
International Criminal Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 9(3) Journal of international 
Criminal Justice 609, 622 (2011).
130  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the wounded and sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 u.N.t.s. 31, Art. 49; Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
sea (second Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 u.N.t.s. 85, Art. 50; Geneva Convention relative 
to the treatment of Prisoners of war (third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 u.N.t.s. 135, 
Art. 129; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of war (Fourth 
Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 u.N.t.s. 287, Art. 146.
131  this obligation is implicit in the complementarity principle established in rome statute of the international 
Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 u.N.t.s. 3, Art. 17. to date only seven Council of europe states have not 
ratified the rome statute: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Monaco, russia, turkey, ukraine.
132  harmen van der wilt & sandra Lyngdorf, Procedural Obligations Under the European Convention on
Human Rights: Useful Guidelines for the Assessment of “Unwillingness” and “Inability” in the Context of the 
Complementarity Principle, 9 international Criminal Law review 39, 69 (2009); Louise doswald-Beck & 
Jean-Marie henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law 607 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 2005).
133  watkin 2004, at 22–24.
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secondly, the burden on the state can be mitigated by interpreting the eChr 
in line with ihL. the eCthr has stated on several occasions that Convention articles 
should be interpreted in line with ihL.134 while the eCthr has not always been true to 
this sentiment,135 in the recent case of Hassan v. UK,136 the Court took a big step toward 
ensuring that the Convention is interpreted in light of ihL in conflict situations. in 
that case, the applicant’s brother had been detained by uk forces in Basrah while 
they were in occupation of the territory. the applicant alleged that his detention 
was arbitrary, unlawful and lacked procedural safeguards in violation of Article 5. 
there the eCthr stated “even in situations of international armed conflict, the 
safeguards under the Convention continue to apply, albeit interpreted against the 
background of the provisions of international humanitarian law.”137 it then proceeded 
to interpret Article 5 in light of ihL, holding that security detention was permissible 
under Article 5, but that the legitimacy of the detention must be reviewed by 
an impartial body, offering fair procedures and ensuring the detention was not 
arbitrary.138 Furthermore derogating from Article 2 for lawful acts of war would also 
force the eCthr to have recourse to ihL to determine the legality of a given use of 
force, thereby further encouraging interpretation of the eChr in light of ihL.
Finally, the eCthr can interpret the obligations in the Convention flexibly to avoid 
placing an unreasonable burden on the state. thus, in Ilaşcu the eCthr stated that
in determining the scope of a state’s positive obligations, regard must 
be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest 
and the interests of the individual, the diversity of situations obtaining in 
Contracting states and the choices which must be made in terms of priorities 
and resources. Nor must these obligations be interpreted in such a way as to 
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden.139
it has shown itself willing to do this on several occasions in the past particularly 
in the context of military operations. in Al-Skeini, for example, the eCthr stated that 
134  Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Applications No. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 
16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 18 september 2009, para. 
185; Georgia v. Russia (II), supra note 15, para. 72.
135  in the case of Isayeva v. Russia, for example, the eCthr failed to consider the applicability of ihL in 
the context of a pitched battle between insurgents and russian armed forces involving airstrikes 
and artillery shelling describing the incidents as “a law enforcement operation” – Isayeva v. Russia, 
supra note 21, para. 180; Philip Leach, The Chechen Conflict: Analysing the Oversight of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 6 european human rights Law review 732, 733–734 (2008).
136  Hassan v. United Kingdom, supra note 14.
137  Id. para. 104.
138  Id. para. 106.
139  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25, para. 332. See also Treska v. Albania and Italy, 
Application No. 26937/04, Judgment (section iii), 29 June 2006.
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it would modify the procedural obligations to investigate in the context of a military 
operation taking into account the “practical problems” investigators face “in a foreign 
and hostile region in the immediate aftermath of invasion and war” and will apply 
the procedural obligation “realistically.”140 similarly in the case of Jaloud v. Netherlands, 
the eCthr stated that it was
prepared to make reasonable allowances for the relatively difficult 
conditions under which the Netherlands military and investigators had to 
work. in particular, it must be recognised that they were engaged in a foreign 
country which had yet to be rebuilt in the aftermath of hostilities, whose 
language and culture were alien to them, and whose population […] clearly 
included armed hostile elements.141
thus, between derogation, interpretation in light of ihL and the general flexibility 
with which the eCthr is prepared to interpret the eChr, the burden of upholding all 
the obligations in Convention can be mitigated both in principle and in practice.
2.2.3. Ukraine’s Responsibility for Human Rights
if the annexation of Crimea is illegitimate and the belligerent occupation ostensibly 
temporary, where does this leave ukraine’s obligations in Crimea? insofar as cases are 
being brought against both russia and ukraine, there are two possible outcomes for 
ukraine: the first scenario is that there will be no modification to the ukraine’s human 
rights obligations in Crimea. the second, more likely scenario, is that the ukraine will 
have to uphold some positive obligations from the eChr in Crimea.
2.2.4. Loss of Territorial Control with No Impact on Human Rights Obligations
there are parallels between the soviet union’s “annexation” of the Baltic states 
after world war ii and the situation in Crimea. when the soviet union collapsed in the 
early 90s, the Baltic states, estonia,142 Latvia143 and Lithuania,144 all issued declarations to 
the effect that they considered their respective states had been subject to belligerent 
140  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 168.
141  Jaloud v. Netherlands, supra note 36, para. 226.
142  supreme Council of estonia, resolution on the National independence of estonia, 20 August 1991 
(Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/history/estonias-return-to-independence-
19871991.html.
143  the Constitution of the republic of Latvia, 19 June 2014, Preamble, states: “the people of Latvia 
did not recognise the occupation regimes, resisted them and regained their freedom by restoring 
national independence on 4 May 1990 on the basis of continuity of the state.”
144  supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, Act on the re-establishment of the state of Lithuania, 
11 March 1990 – “the execution of the sovereign powers of the state of Lithuania abolished by foreign 
forces in 1940 is re-established.”
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occupation since the end of world war ii and that they were re-asserting their 
sovereignty over their territory. the annexation of these states was never recognised 
by the wider international community. Currently the international community 
considers that Crimea remains a part of ukraine and its eChr obligations are, 
therefore, presumed to extend to this territory, unless this presumption is rebutted.145 
thus, improbable as it may seem, the eCthr could rule that ukraine is obliged to 
uphold all of its human rights obligations in Crimea. there is some precedent at the 
eCthr for the Court to compel a state that has lost control over its de jure territory 
to uphold all Convention rights as normal within that territory.
in Assanidze v. Georgia, the eCthr looked at how the presumption of jurisdiction 
over territory could be rebutted. the case concerned a politician who was detained in 
the Ajarian Autonomous republic, which is part of Georgia’s territory. the Georgian 
supreme Court ordered his release, but the Ajarian authorities refused to release him. 
the politician took a case against Georgia claiming inter alia that his right to liberty 
under Article 5 was being infringed.146 the eCthr examined several factors: the fact 
that Georgia had extended the Convention to the entire territory, it had not issued 
any reservations to the Convention, the territory had no separatist aspirations and 
was not subject to the effective overall control of another state.147 this final caveat 
is crucial to our discussion of Crimea. After taking these factors into account, the 
eCthr concluded that the presumption was not rebutted. it conducted a similar 
inquiry into Moldova’s control over the Mrt in the Ilaşcu case.148
thus, Assanidze establishes the principle that where there is any reason to question 
the state’s de facto control over its de jure territory, the eCthr will conduct a detailed 
examination of the prevailing legal and factual elements to determine whether 
the presumption of jurisdiction has been rebutted. however, that is not always the 
case with the eCthr. in Isayeva v. Russia,149 there were serious doubts over russia’s de 
facto control over its de jure territory in Chechnya. the russian Federation’s control 
over Chechnya was challenged by an entrenched insurgency there. in October 
1999, Grozny was under the control of Chechen insurgents who launched attacks 
on the russian armed forces.150 russia had clearly lost de facto control over Grozny 
and laid siege to the city in order to regain control. russia established a safe exit 
route for civilians in Grozny to escape from the fighting. however, the russian armed 
145  Costelloe 2016, at 373.
146  Assanidze v. Georgia, supra note 55, para. 151.
147  Id. paras. 140–142.
148  the eCthr looked at whether reservations had been issued in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 
supra note 25, para. 324, and the existence of secessionist entities on the territory in para. 325.
149  Isayeva v. Russia, supra note 21.
150  william Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights 
in Chechnya, 16(4) european Journal of international Law 741, 754 (2005).
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forces launched an air attack on the civilians as they fled. the applicant lost family 
members in the attack and brought a case against russia. the eCthr itself implicitly 
acknowledged that russia had lost control over the area stating “[t]he situation 
in Chechnya had called for exceptional measures on behalf of the state in order 
to regain control over the republic and to suppress the illegal armed insurgency” 
(emphasis added).151
the eCthr had also previously stated in Ilaşcu that:
jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the state’s 
territory. this presumption may be limited in exceptional circumstances, 
particularly where a state is prevented from exercising its authority in part of its 
territory. that may be as a result of military occupation by the armed forces of 
another state which effectively controls the territory concerned, acts of war or 
rebellion, or the acts of a foreign state supporting the installation of a separatist 
state within the territory of the state concerned.152 (emphasis added)
despite the acknowledgement by the eCthr that control had been lost in 
Isayeva and that the presumption of control could be “limited” by “acts of rebellion” 
in Ilaşcu, the eCthr did not conduct any inquiry into whether the presumption that 
russia controlled Grozny was rebutted, as it had in Assanidze. Nor did it modify the 
obligations that russia owed to the civilians in Grozny in line with Ilaşcu and other 
cases.153 the eCthr obliged russia to uphold the positive obligation to investigate 
the deaths in this case,154 and the positive obligation to protect the right to life of the 
applicant and her relatives.155
the disparities between these cases suggest that the eCthr is not holding states 
in comparable situations to the same standards, nor is it consistently assessing 
whether the presumption of jurisdiction is rebutted of its own volition where this is 
apparent. there are numerous possible reasons for this. First, russia did not actively 
deny that it was capable of exercising jurisdiction in Chechnya. in many cases where 
a state actively denies that it is exercising jurisdiction, the eCthr holds the state 
to a corresponding lower level of obligations.156 secondly, it has been argued that 
151  Isayeva v. Russia, supra note 21, para. 178.
152  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25, para. 312.
153  See the eCthr’s findings in cases like Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 58 and Ivantoc and 
Others v. Moldova and Russia, Application No. 23687/05, Judgment (section iv), 15 November 2011.
154  Isayeva v. Russia, supra note 21, para. 224.
155  Id. para. 201.
156  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25; Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra 
note 58; Azemi v. Serbia, Application No. 11209/09, Judgment (section ii), 5 November 2013; Jularic 
v. Croatia, Application No. 20106/06, Judgment (section i), 20 January 2011.
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where a secessionist entity lacks the support of another state, it cannot rebut the 
presumption of jurisdiction.157 this distinction is crucial. As the Chechen separatists 
were not backed by another state, there was no other state to assume the mantle 
of human rights protection in Chechnya, it would have resulted in a lacuna in the 
Convention’s protection if the eCthr held that russia was not responsible,158 a lacuna 
the eCthr was obviously keen to avoid. thus, unless a secessionist entity is supported 
by another state, there is no other party available to assume the duty to guarantee 
human rights within the territory and the eCthr is less likely to reduce the obligations 
on the state losing control over the territory.159
this interpretation of the law was expressly confirmed in Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan.160 
that case revolved around the village of Gulistan, which was situated on the line 
of contact between Azerbaijan and Armenia in their protracted dispute over the 
Nagorno-karabakh region. several villagers were displaced from their homes in 
Gulistan by the conflict and sought compensation for their loss of property as the 
village was effectively in no man’s land between the two armies. Azerbaijan claims 
the village is part of its de jure territory and its armed forces occupied the village, but 
they have been surrounded by Armenian troops in a strategically superior position for 
many years and the area is surrounded by mines. Azerbaijan argued that they should 
not be obliged to uphold full human rights obligations in the Convention in disputed 
zones or “areas which are rendered inaccessible by the circumstances.”161 while the 
eCthr accepted that Azerbaijan “may encounter difficulties at a practical level in 
exercising their authority in the area of Gulistan,”162 this did not alter their human 
rights obligations there. Gulistan remained subject to the de facto control of the 
Azerbaijani government and as a result the presumption that it exercised jurisdiction 
there was not displaced. it noted that the state’s responsibility has only been limited 
in previous cases when another state or separatist regime exercises effective control 
over the territory.163 the eCthr referred to the “need to avoid a vacuum in Convention 
157  kjetil Mujezinovic Larsen, Territorial Non-Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, 78 
Nordic Journal of international Law 73, 82–83 (2009).
158  Note the eCthr’s desire to avoid any such gaps in protection in other cases such as Banković and 
Others v. Belgium and Others, supra note 28, para. 78; Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra 
note 18, para. 142; Bijelic v. Montenegro and Serbia, Application No. 11890/05, Judgment (section ii), 
28 April 2009.
159  For a thorough discussion of the human rights obligations of de facto entities see Anthony Cullen & 
steven wheatley, The Human Rights of Individuals in De Facto Regimes Under the European Convention 
on Human Rights, 13 human rights Law review 691 (2013).
160  Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, supra note 69, para. 94.
161  Id. para. 146.
162  Id. para. 150.
163  Id. para. 140.
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protection,”164 which could be caused by creating an exception like that suggested 
by Azerbaijan. it therefore ruled that Azerbaijan continued to exercise jurisdiction 
there for the purposes of the Convention, even though Azerbaijan had such limited 
control over the territory. thus, while it is conceivable that ukraine could be obliged 
to uphold all the Convention obligations in Crimea (notwithstanding the derogations 
it has proclaimed), the fact that the Crimean separatists are backed by russia reduces 
the practical possibility of this.
2.2.5. Positive Obligations
the second, more likely, albeit much more complicated, scenario is that ukraine 
is obliged to uphold some of its Convention obligations in Crimea. it stands to reason 
that if spatial jurisdiction for the purposes of the eChr can be acquired over territory 
occupied and controlled, spatial jurisdiction can be lost over territory where control 
is ceded such that the eChr obligations are reduced or removed entirely. yet when 
a state loses de facto control over its territory, uncertainty arises over the obligations 
the state owes. in Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia,165 which is comparable in many respects 
to the situation in Crimea, the eCthr examined a situation where a state had lost de 
facto control over its de jure territory. Moldova was part of the ussr until it collapsed 
in the 1990s. Moldova declared independence in 1991 and claimed transdniestria as 
part of its territory. transdniestria was part of the Moldavian soviet socialist republic, 
which was succeeded by the Moldovan state. After the ussr collapsed, its fourteenth 
army remained in transdniestria and declared independence as the “Moldavian 
republic of transdniestria” (Mrt) in 1991. Akin to Crimea, the Mrt has not been 
internationally recognised as an independent state.166 Moldova continues to claim 
transdniestria as part of its de jure territory, despite its inability to exercise de facto 
control there for decades. the eCthr has addressed similar situations where the 
state in de jure control fails to exercise de facto control.167
the four applicants in Ilaşcu were arrested in the Mrt in 1992 and charged with 
offences, including murder and “anti-soviet activities.” they were tried and sentenced 
by the supreme Court of the Mrt and detained for a number of years. they also 
alleged that numerous violations of the Convention had arisen from their trial and 
detention and sought to hold russia and Moldova responsible. they claimed that 
Moldova should have interceded with the Mrt to stop the Convention violations 
164  Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, supra note 69, para. 148.
165  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25.
166  Id. paras. 28–41.
167  Cypriot control over the turkish republic of Northern Cyprus in Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 17; 
Georgian control over south Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia v. Russia (II), supra note 15; Azerbaijani 
and Armenian control over different parts of Nagorno-karabakh in Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, supra note 
69 and Chiragov v. Armenia, supra note 75.
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arising from their detention. they alleged that russia was exercising jurisdiction in 
the Mrt because it exercised de facto control over the area and should therefore be 
held responsible for the Convention violations.168 Our focus here is on how the Court 
treated Moldova’s jurisdiction over the Mrt. the eCthr ruled that the Moldovan 
government was the only legitimate government of the republic of Moldova under 
international law, but that it did not exercise authority over the Mrt.169 this is similar 
in many respects to the situation in Crimea where russia’s “annexation” has not been 
recognised internationally and with Crimea being perceived as a continuing part of 
ukrainian territory over which it has lost control.170 however, the lack of control over 
this territory was not a barrier to Moldova exercising jurisdiction for the purposes 
of Article 1. the eCthr stated
where a Contracting state is prevented from exercising its authority over the 
whole of its territory by a constraining de facto situation […] it does not thereby 
cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Art. 1 of the Convention over 
that part of its territory […] such a factual situation reduces the scope of that 
jurisdiction in that the undertaking given by the state under Article 1 must 
be considered by the Court only in the light of the Contracting state’s positive 
obligations towards persons within its territory. the state in question must 
endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis 
foreign states and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention.171
the scope of Moldova’s jurisdiction was reduced so that it was only obliged to 
uphold its positive obligations. thus, the ukrainian government’s assertion that 
the russian Federation is “fully responsible” for upholding Convention rights in the 
“annexed” territory does not match the eCthr’s jurisprudence as ukraine is, at the 
very least, partially responsible for upholding positive obligations in Crimea.
the exact positive obligations Moldova had to uphold in the Mrt, and by 
extension ukraine in Crimea, are extremely unclear. the very notion that states can 
owe positive obligations when they are not exercising de facto control has been 
168  it is worth noting, in the context of our discussion of Crimea, that the eCthr determined in Ilascu 
that russia could be held responsible for what happened in the Mrt because it provided military, 
economic, financial and political support to the territory. By virtue of its receiving this support, the 
territory remained under the effective authority, or at the very least under the decisive influence, of 
the russian Federation – Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25, para. 392.
169  Id. para. 330.
170  kirchner argues that russia’s aim in encouraging the creation of self-proclaimed independent “states” 
in Moldova, Georgia and now ukraine is to de-stabilize these countries to the point where NAtO 
membership and eu membership becomes impossible – kirchner 2015, at 42.
171  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25, para. 333.
RUSSIAN LAW JOURNAL    Volume VI (2018) Issue 3 40
questioned.172 On the one hand, the eCthr implies that the state must “take the 
diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are 
in accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed 
by the Convention.”173 On the other hand, it has stated
Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities 
should take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must 
verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the 
present case. when faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court’s task 
is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible 
and whether it should have been made.174
thus, it is unclear whether the state must take “all the measures within its 
power” – diplomatic, economic, judicial – or simply undertake a “minimum effort.” 
the eCthr ruled that Moldova had positive obligations to re-establish control over 
its territory and to take measures to ensure the applicants’ rights,175 holding that 
Moldova had failed to make sufficient efforts to secure the release of the detainees, 
because it had not raised the issue during negotiations with russia over the Mrt.176 
Leaving aside the discomfort generated by the eCthr dictating the foreign policy 
of an independent state, the eCthr has failed to clarify the scope and content of 
these positive obligations in subsequent cases.
in Ivantoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia,177 the eCthr seemed to follow an 
“all measures within its power” approach. in that case, several of the applicants in 
Ilaşcu sought to hold Moldova responsible for not doing all they could to secure their 
Convention rights. the eCthr held Moldova had discharged its positive obligation as it 
had “constantly raised the issue of the applicants’ fate in their bilateral relations with the 
russian Federation” and continually sought assistance from international organisations 
and other states.178 By contrast, the eCthr seemed to follow the “minimum effort” 
172  Michal Gondek, Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Territorial 
Focus in the Age of Globalization?, 52 Netherlands international Law review 349, 368 (2005). hampson 
argues that certain positive obligations require the kind of control a state only has over its own 
territory before they can be fulfilled – Francoise hampson, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the 
Interoperability of the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights Law, 87 international Law student 
series us Naval war Collection 187, 189 (2011).
173  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25, para. 331.
174  Id. para. 334.
175  Id. para. 339.
176  Id. para. 349.
177  Ivantoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 153.
178  Id. para. 109.
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approach in Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia.179 in that case, the Mrt had 
banned the use of Latin script in schools, forcibly evicting students from their classes 
and forcing them to attend special schools. when the applicants complained that 
Moldova had not protected their right to education and should have raised this issue 
diplomatically with russia,180 the eCthr held that Moldova had satisfied its positive 
obligation by refurbishing the new schools, paying their rent and covering other 
costs of running them.181 More recently in Mozer v. Moldova and Russia,182 the applicant, 
a German national, had been detained by the Mrt and complained inter alia that his 
detention was unlawful. the eCthr reverted to the test in Ilaşcu stating that Moldova 
had to “use all the legal and diplomatic means available to it to continue to guarantee 
the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention to those living 
[in the Mrt].”183 the eCthr eventually concluded that Moldova had satisfied its positive 
obligations because it had appealed to intergovernmental organisations and other 
countries, including russia, to assist in securing the applicant’s rights.184
in sum, the extent of the ukraine’s positive obligations toward Crimea remain 
unclear in light of the eCthr’s jurisprudence. it is unclear whether ukraine has an 
obligation to do everything diplomatically, economically and legally within its power 
to secure the rights of the individuals in Crimea or whether the ukraine is only 
obliged to undertake a minimum effort to secure their rights.
2.3. Conclusion on Crimea
to conclude our analysis of jurisdiction between ukraine and russia in Crimea, 
the situation is deeply unclear. the eCthr could determine that russia is obliged 
to uphold all the Convention obligations in Crimea and has full spatial jurisdiction, 
as it has with territories such as the trNC in Loizidou. this outcome would lead to 
a higher level of human rights protection for the inhabitants of Crimea (all positive 
and negative Convention obligations) and be much clearer for the state. however, 
it is entirely possible that the eCthr will find that jurisdictional links only arise in 
Crimea under the personal jurisdiction model, discussed further below, or something 
in between full spatial jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, such as the personal 
plus jurisdiction discussed above and set out in Al-Skeini. the consequences of these 
different approaches can lead to wildly different levels of obligation on the state. 
For example, a state with full spatial jurisdiction would have to investigate every 
179  Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 58.
180  Id. para. 129.
181  Id. paras. 147 and 148.
182  Mozer v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 58.
183  Id. para. 100.
184  Id. paras. 153–155.
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death occurring in a given territory, including those caused by third parties, whereas 
jurisdiction arising under the personal jurisdiction model would only oblige the state 
to investigate deaths where a state agent was directly involved or implicated.
the ukraine’s eChr obligations with respect to Crimea are perhaps even less 
clear. ukraine may be obliged to uphold all its eChr obligations with respect to 
Crimea, though it is perhaps more likely that it will only be obliged to uphold positive 
obligations under the Convention there. the exact scope and extent of these positive 
obligations remains unclear in the eCthr’s jurisprudence, with the Court oscillating 
between demanding that the state do everything in its power to resolve a human 
rights complaint in some cases and engage in a minimum effort to resolve complaints 
in others. the uncertainty surrounding each state’s obligations with respect to Crimea 
is obviously deeply unsatisfactory for both the state and potential victims of human 
rights abuses. the Court can improve the situation by consistently testing whether 
spatial jurisdiction exists in these scenarios and assessing whether the presumption 
of jurisdiction is rebutted when a state’s de facto control is at issue.
while the distribution of human rights responsibilities in Crimea is deeply 
uncertain, the annexation itself was relatively straightforward with one commentator 
describing the operation as “the smoothest invasion of modern times.”185 the relative 
ease with which russia annexed Crimea is a stark contrast to the entrenched military 
conflict on-going in eastern ukraine. in early March 2014, russian troops amassed 
along ukraine’s eastern border.186 in April, pro-russian separatists seized control of 
towns within the donetsk and Luhansk regions and declared their independence.187 
the ukrainian military responded by driving the rebels out of the city of slavyansk 
and encircling the de facto capital of donetsk. the violence escalated throughout 
the summer months, most notably contributing to the shooting down of Malaysian 
Flight Mh17.188 An Organisation for security and Co-operation in europe (hereinafter 
OsCe) monitored ceasefire signed in september was short-lived as the conflict 
185  John simpson, Russia’s Crimea Plan Detailed, Secret and Successful, BBC News, 19 March 2014 (Aug. 2, 
2018), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26644082.
186  Laura smith-spark et al., What Do We Know About Russia’s Troop Buildup on Ukraine’s Border?, CNN, 
28 March 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/28/world/europe/russia-
ukraine-troop-buildup; Jon swaine, Russian Troops May Be Massing to Invade Ukraine, Says White 
House, the Guardian, 23 March 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/mar/23/russian-troops-may-invade-ukraine-white-house.
187  For further context on the conflict see reeves & wallace 2015, at 365–372.
188  kashmira Gander, Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 Crash: Nine Britons, 23 Americans and 80 Children’ 
Feared Dead After Boeing Passenger Jet Is “Shot Down” Near Ukraine-Russia Border, the independent, 
17 July 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/malaysia-
airlines-plane-crash-boeing-jet-carrying-295-people-crashes-in-ukraine-9612882.html; sabrina 
tavernise et al., Jetliner Explodes over Ukraine; Struck by Missile, Officials Say, New york times, 17 July 
2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/world/europe/malaysian-
airlines-plane-ukraine.html?_r=0.
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continued into the autumn and winter.189 After a significant increase in violence at 
the turn of the year, a second ceasefire was signed in February 2015.190 there have 
been numerous military engagements and severe human rights violations since this 
ceasefire was signed. unlike in Crimea, in eastern ukraine the russian government 
has consistently refused to acknowledge that it is playing a role in the conflict.191
this section considers the human rights obligations that ukraine and russia 
owe to individuals within the eastern regions of the country.192 the factual profile 
of the violence in eastern ukraine makes the pursuit of enforceable human rights 
obligations more complex. Primarily this is because there are three main actors in 
the conflict: 1) pro-russian rebels, purportedly in receipt of continuing support from 
the russian Federation; 2) the ukrainian armed forces and security services; 3) pro-
ukrainian volunteer groups. thus, in addition to navigating the eCthr’s inconsistent 
approach to jurisdiction, those alleging human rights abuses arising from the conflict 
will also be required to demonstrate that the perpetrator’s actions can be attributed 
to either the ukrainian or russian state.
3. Ukraine’s Responsibility for Human Rights
this section addresses both the questions of attribution and jurisdiction with 
regard to ukraine’s human rights responsibilities. when addressing the issue of 
189  Organization for security and Co-operation in europe, Protocol on the results of Consultations of the 
trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk, 5 september 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.
osce.org/home/123257. See also Organization for security and Co-operation in europe, Memorandum 
of 19 september 2014 Outlining the Parameters for the implementation of Commitments of the 
Minsk Protocol of 5 september 2014, 19 september 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.
osce.org/home/123806.
190  Matthew weaver & Alec Luhn, Ukraine Ceasefire Agreed at Belarus Talks, the Guardian, 12 February 2015 
(Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/12/ukraine-crisis-reports-
emerge-of-agreement-in-minsk-talks; Minsk Agreement on ukraine Crisis: text in Full, the telegraph, 
12 February 2015 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
ukraine/11408266/minsk-agreement-on-ukraine-crisis-text-in-full.html.
191  when asked in April 2014 whether there were russian soldiers in eastern ukraine vladimir Putin stated: 
“Nonsense. there are no russian units in eastern ukraine – no special services, no tactical advisors. 
All this is being done by the local residents, and the proof of that is the fact that those people have 
literally removed their masks.” President of russia, direct Line with vladimir Putin, 17 April 2014 (Aug. 2, 
2018), available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796. A year later in April 2015 Putin 
reiterated this denial: “Finally, the question of whether russian troops are present in ukraine… i can 
tell you outright and unequivocally that there are no russian troops in ukraine.” President of russia, 
direct Line with vladimir Putin, 16 April 2015 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/49261. he has since qualified this by conceding that russian military intelligence 
officers were operating on ukrainian territory. shaun walker, Putin Admits Russian Military Presence 
in Ukraine for First Time, the Guardian, 17 december 2015 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/vladimir-putin-admits-russian-military-presence-ukraine.
192  the regions under which pro-russian rebels exercise influence are donetsk and Luhansk. rebels 
in both regions have defined themselves as “People’s republics.” OhChr report June 2016, supra 
note 9, at 4–5.
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attribution in previous cases, the eCthr has naturally looked to the definitions of 
state responsibility found in public international law. this approach was recognised 
in the case of Behrami where the Court recalled that
the principles underlying the Convention cannot be interpreted 
and applied in a vacuum. it must also take into account relevant rules of 
international law when examining questions concerning its jurisdiction and, 
consequently, determine state responsibility in conformity and harmony 
with the governing principles of international law of which it forms part, 
although it must remain mindful of the Convention’s special character as 
a human rights treaty.193
the position is relatively straightforward with regard to attributing responsibility 
for actions conducted by ukrainian military, police and security forces in eastern 
ukraine who are engaged in their “anti-terrorism” operation against pro-russian 
groups.194 in such situations, these are state agents acting on behalf of their 
government, which gives rise to their responsibility under the Convention.
the situation is less clear where the actions of armed groups not directly affiliated 
with either state are concerned. these are not individuals who make up the organs of 
the state, but instead those whose conduct may be directed or controlled by the state. 
this is dealt with under Article 8 of the Articles on state responsibility which states
the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act 
of a state under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact 
acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that state 
in carrying out the conduct.195
the requirements that an individual or group is operating on the “instructions,” 
following the “direction,” or under the “control” of the state, are to be read disjunctively.196 
thus attribution will arise if any one of these three factors is established. within this 
rule the notions of instruction and direction are readily intelligible and arguably set 
quite a high standard for when action can be attributed to the state.197
193  Behrami v. France, supra note 19, para. 122.
194  ukraine says donetsk “Anti-terror Operation” under way, BBC News, 16 April 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27035196.
195  draft Articles on state responsibility, Crawford 2001, Art. 8. Article 4-11 of the draft Articles of state 
responsibility are now considered to reflect customary international law. See also Stocke v. Germany, 
supra note 61 which confirms this approach to the law.
196  Crawford 2001, at 48.
197  the intention of which is to identify “the existence of a real link between the person or group 
performing the act and the state machinery.” Crawford 2001, at 47.
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As with the test for control over individuals or territory, the definition of control of 
an armed group is often seen as being less certain and thus more flexible. Nonetheless, 
while necessarily being dependent on the facts of each given allegation of abuse, 
a strong case could be made that ukrainian volunteer battalions who commit human 
rights abuses could have their conduct attributed to the ukrainian state. the OhChr 
special Mission to ukraine has noted that the structure of the ukrainian security 
operation aimed at regaining control of the eastern regions of donetsk and Luhansk 
“involves the army, the military police (National Guard), the National security service 
(sBu) and volunteers’ battalions.”198 the presence of these volunteer battalions within 
the wider organisational arrangement of this operation denotes that the volunteers 
are most likely following the direction, or acting on the instructions, of the ukrainian 
state so as to engage Article 8 of the Articles on state responsibility.199
despite the ease with which this attribution question may be resolved there 
remains a high degree of uncertainty over whether ukraine exercises sufficient 
jurisdiction, as it is understood in Article 1 eChr, over its eastern regions for its human 
rights obligations to apply. On analysis two possible interpretations emerge.
3.1. Scenario 1 – Ukraine Exercises Jurisdiction Throughout Its Territory
the first interpretation of ukraine’s human rights responsibilities is to follow 
the eCthr’s basic presumption that the application of the Convention is “primarily 
territorial,” and thus ukraine owes human rights obligations throughout its entire 
territory. this interpretation came to the fore in the Court’s jurisprudence following the 
2001 case of Banković.200 in Banković, the Court relied heavily on public international 
law principles of state jurisdiction holding that the Convention’s application is 
“primarily territorial”201 and that jurisdiction would only arise extra-territorially in 
exceptional circumstances which were “subordinate to that state’s and other states’ 
198  Office of the united Nations high Commissioner for human rights, report on the human rights 
situation in ukraine – 15 July 2014, 15 July 2014, at 3 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.ohchr.
org/documents/Countries/uA/ukraine_report_15July2014.pdf.
199  Crawford 2001, Art. 8. the ukrainian position also falls squarely within the example provided in the 
following commentary on the draft Articles of state responsibility: “Most commonly, cases of this 
kind will arise where state organs supplement their own action by recruiting or instigating private 
persons or groups who act as ‘auxiliaries’ while remaining outside the official structure of the state. 
these include, for example, individuals or groups of private individuals who, though not specifically 
commissioned by the state and not forming part of its police or armed forces, are employed as 
auxiliaries or are sent as ‘volunteers’ to neighbouring countries, or who are instructed to carry out 
particular missions abroad.” Crawford 2001, at 47.
200  Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, supra note 28, para. 59.
201  the Court went on to state that: “while international law does not exclude a state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction extra-territorially, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction (including nationality, flag, 
diplomatic and consular relations, effect, protection, passive personality and universality) are, as 
a general rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant states.” Id.
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territorial competence.”202 this approach has been followed repeatedly by the eCthr 
since.203 it simplifies the application of the Convention insofar as eastern ukraine is 
concerned, however – as demonstrated above – there is the possibility that ukraine 
can rebut the presumption that it exercises sufficient control over some of its territory 
so as to limit its obligations. this is an avenue which ukraine would be likely to take 
given the derogation which it filed in 2015 where it stated
in view of armed aggression of the russian Federation against ukraine 
involving both regular Armed Forces of the russian Federation and illegal 
armed groups guided, controlled and financed by the russian Federation, an 
anti-terrorist operation is being conducted by the units of the security service 
of ukraine, the Ministry of internal Affairs of ukraine and the Armed Forces 
of ukraine since April 2014, on the territory of certain areas of the donetsk 
and Luhansk oblasts of ukraine. the anti-terrorist operation is a part of the 
inalienable right of ukraine to individual self-defense against aggression 
according to Article 51 of the uN Charter. the russian Federation, which 
actually occupies and exercises control over certain areas of the donetsk 
and Luhansk oblasts, is fully responsible for respect for and protection of 
human rights in these territories under international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law.204
that argument would be strengthened when one looks at the factual 
circumstances in eastern ukraine as presented in the case of Lisnyy v. Ukraine 
and Russia, the first case considering the conflict to be resolved by the eCthr. 
the application was brought against both ukraine and russia by three residents 
of the donetsk and Luhansk regions whose homes had been either damaged or 
202  Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, supra note 28, para. 60. the Grand Chamber in Banković 
had relied on the following passage in the Soering case to make this statement: “Article 1 of the 
Convention, which provides that ‘the high Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in section i,’ sets a limit, notably territorial, on the 
reach of the Convention.” Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, Judgment, 7 July 
1989, para. 86. it should be noted that this statement was made in a judgment of July 1989 and 
was not reiterated in the jurisprudence concerning Article 1 until the Banković case twelve years 
later, suggesting a high degree of selectivity in the Court’s use of its own principles. For instance, it 
was not mentioned in the most significant jurisdiction case heard in the interim Loizidou v. Turkey 
(Preliminary Objections), supra note 31.
203  See, for instance, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, supra note 28, para. 71, where the Court referred to jurisdiction 
as “essentially territorial.” Djokaba Lambi Longa v. the Netherlands, Application No. 33917/12, decision, 
9 October 2012, para. 69. Although the united kingdom defence Committee have questioned the 
presumption of territoriality in the application of the Convention, noting that “[m]ore recent cases, 
in particular Al-Skeini, have changed this position” – uk Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal 
Framework for Future Operations, supra note 117, para. 49.
204  ukrainian Government, resolution of the verkhovna rada, supra note 5.
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destroyed.205 in respect of ukraine, the applicants complained that it was impossible to 
have several of their rights guaranteed because “all the state institutions in eastern 
ukraine, including the courts, suspended their operations and were relocated to 
areas controlled by the Government of ukraine.”206 similar conditions are also noted 
in the subsequent judgment of Khlebik v. Ukraine, where the applicant’s appeal 
against a criminal conviction was delayed due to case files being located in an area 
which the Court noted was “not under the ukrainian Government’s control.”207 this 
factual profile, combined with the derogation that ukraine has filed with the Court, 
contribute to the picture that ukrainian authorities no longer exercise control over 
some areas in the east of the country.208
As noted in the previous section, when questions about whether a state exercises 
de facto control over its territory arise, it is unclear which approach the Court will 
take when determining whether the operative parts of the Convention will continue 
to apply.209 Applying Assanidze, the Court would conduct a detailed examination 
of the prevailing legal and factual elements. importantly it would look to the fact 
that ukraine had extended the Convention throughout its territory – subject to the 
derogations; that the regions of donetsk and Luhansk clearly have some separatist 
aspirations, and that there could be an argument made that the regions were now 
subject to the effective overall control of another state.210 On the last point, while the 
actions of pro-russian rebels would still require the test of attribution to be resolved, 
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that these armed groups have at least some 
control over the territory. the OhChr reports on ukraine have noted that “[t]he self-
proclaimed ‘donetsk people’s republic’ and self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ 
have undermined the human rights of the estimated 2.7 million people residing under 
205  Lisnyy v. Ukraine and Russia, supra note 51, paras. 1–18.
206  Id. para. 19.
207  Khlebik v. Ukraine, Application No. 2945/16, Judgment (section iv), 25 July 2017, para. 3.
208  the Court declared the application in Lisnyy and Others v. Ukraine inadmissible as the applicants 
had not sufficiently substantiated this case. interestingly, the Court did so while recognising that 
the applicants would naturally have faced real practical difficulties in establishing their case given 
the conflict – Id. para. 29.
209  Article 15 (derogation in time of emergency) of the Convention allows for Contracting Parties to 
derogate, in a limited manner, from their obligation to secure some rights under the Convention. it 
should be noted that a number of core rights are non-derogable. the following provisions are non-
derogable: the right to life, except in the context of lawful acts of war; the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the prohibition of slavery and servitude; the rule of 
“no punishment without law”; Article 1 (abolishing the death penalty in peacetime) of Protocol No. 6; 
Article 1 (abolishing the death penalty in all circumstances) of Protocol No. 13 and Article 4 (the right 
not to be tried or punished twice) of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. For a more comprehensive 
discussion on derogations within the eChr framework see Bart van der sloot, Is All Fair in Love and War? 
An Analysis of the Case Law on Article 15 ECHR, 53(2) Military Law and Law of war review 319 (2014).
210  Assanidze v. Georgia, supra note 55, paras. 140–142.
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their control” (emphasis added).211 the reports have reiterated the pro-russian rebels’ 
exercise of control on several occasions.212 specifically it has been noted that there 
is an “absence of effective control of the Government of ukraine over considerable 
parts of the border with the russian Federation (in certain areas of donetsk and 
Luhansk regions).”213 By itself this could present a strong case that the ukraine no longer 
exercises jurisdiction over some of the area, however, the question which arises is 
whether the eCthr will follow this test from Assanidze or select a different path. As 
illustrated by Isayeva, where russia had arguably lost control of areas of Chechnya, 
the Court is not always willing to engage with these issues.214
the contextual conditions in Chechnya during the Isayeva application bear 
striking similarities to the loss of control experienced by ukraine in donetsk and 
Luhansk. in both situations, the territorial state has resorted to armed force to 
displace an entrenched insurgency. it would be entirely possible for the eCthr to 
follow the same approach it did in Isayeva and avoid conducting any inquiry into 
whether ukraine has lost de facto control of parts of its territory, instead making 
a finding that ukraine continued to owe Convention obligations within the conflict 
zones. this would, in turn, mean that ukraine could be obliged to uphold positive 
obligations to investigate deaths,215 and positive obligations to protect the right to life 
of civilians within the relevant areas.216 it is notable that neither of these obligations 
will be covered under the ukrainian derogation.
if the Court were to conduct a detailed analysis and resolve that the ukraine had 
lost its obligations in the areas under the de facto control of pro-russian separatists, 
then the Court would most likely, in parallel, recognise russia’s exercise of jurisdiction 
within the relevant areas. As noted above in Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan,217 the Court is 
very reluctant to recognise the existence of a vacuum of human rights protection, 
where no Contracting Party exercises jurisdiction over an area which under normal 
circumstances would receive Convention protection.
211  OhChr report June 2016, supra note 9, at 7.
212  the reports have noted that “the population living in the territories controlled by the armed groups has 
been effectively denied basic protection and deprived of basic human rights and freedoms.” Id. in 2014 
a report noted that “[c]urrently, armed groups remain in control of about 100 kilometers of the ukraine-
russian Federation border” – Office of the united Nations high Commissioner for human rights, report 
on the human rights situation in ukraine – 17 August 2014, 29 August 2014, at 5 (Aug. 2, 2018), available 
at http://www.ohchr.org/documents/Countries/uA/ukrainereport28August2014.pdf.
213  Office of the united Nations high Commissioner for human rights, report on the human rights 
situation in ukraine – 16 August to 15 November 2015, 9 december 2015, at 2 (Aug. 2, 2018), available 
at http://www.ohchr.org/documents/Countries/uA/12thOhChrreportukraine.pdf.
214  Isayeva v. Russia, supra note 21.
215  Id. para. 224.
216  Id. para. 201.
217  Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, supra note 69.
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3.2. Scenario 2 – Ukraine Owes Only Positive Obligations in Eastern Ukraine
An alternative possibility would be that ukraine’s responsibility is limited to only 
positive obligations by virtue of its loss of de facto control over the areas in question. 
such an approach would be akin to the eCthr position in Ilaşcu and Catan, where 
Moldova’s obligations were limited in transdniestria.218 while this is perhaps the 
most likely interpretation that the eCthr could arrive at, there remains a high-level 
of uncertainty over which positive obligations ukraine would need to fulfil.
An example of where this question may arise relates to the downing of Malaysian 
Airlines Flight Mh17.219 in July 2014, the commercial passenger airline was shot down 
over eastern ukraine killing all 283 passengers and 15 crew members. the mother 
of one of the German passengers has brought a case against ukraine to the eCthr 
for its failure to close the airspace above the conflict zone.220 Although it is largely 
accepted that the flight was shot down by pro-russian rebels, ukraine could still be 
held in violation of the positive obligation under Article 2 to protect life for failing to 
close its airspace.221 the question to be addressed would be whether this is one of the 
positive obligations which was applicable and what level of action would be required 
to fulfil the obligation. Following Ilaşcu, it is clear that a contracting state needs to 
make at least “a minimum effort” to protect individuals within de jure territory over 
which it has lost de facto control.222 this would suggest that the applicant could have 
some success before the Court, but, as explained above, only if ukraine had been 
obligated to act through exercising its jurisdiction in the first place.
in sum, there is a distinct lack of clarity with regards to what obligations are owed 
by ukraine in its eastern territories. ukraine may be responsible for all obligations 
which it has not derogated from in respect of donetsk and Luhansk, only positive 
obligations in respect of these rights, or no obligations at all. the uncertainty means 
218  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25 and Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 
supra note 58.
219  For one perspective on ukraine’s human rights obligations in relation to this action see daniela Copetti 
Cravo, Ukraine Liability for Violation of Human Rights in the Downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, 
12 Brazilian Journal of international Law 728 (2015) (in Portuguese).
220  AFP, Mother of German MH17 Victim Takes Ukraine to Human Rights Court, the telegraph, 30 November 2014 
(Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11263486/
mother-of-german-mh17-victim-takes-ukraine-to-human-rights-court.html. the eCthr confirmed it has 
received this communication in december 2014. the case, Ioppa v. Ukraine, Application No. 73776/14, 
has been given priority status. ukraine: Flight Mh17 Crash victim’s Mother Lodges Court Complaint, 
human rights europe, 1 december 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.humanrightseurope.
org/2014/12/ukraine-flight-mh17-crash-victims-mother-lodges-court-complaint/.
221  AFP, Mother of German MH17 Victim Takes Ukraine to Human Rights Court, supra note 220. A Joint 
investigation team established in response to the attack recently stated that it “is convinced that the 
Buk-teLAr that was used to down Mh17, originates from the 53rd Anti Aircraft Missile brigade […], 
a unit of the russian army from kursk in the russian Federation” (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://
www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@103196/update-criminal-0/.
222  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25, para. 334.
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that the state is partially unaware, and thus able to plead ignorance, as to the 
range of rights it owes. Although the uncertainty affords the eCthr with flexibility 
in interpreting particular levels of application to different factual circumstances, 
this approach sacrifices any meaningful legal certainty and thus states cannot 
adequately plan their actions with the awareness of what their precise obligations 
are. the uncertainty also means that individuals alleging breaches of the Convention 
will not be aware of which state owed them human rights obligations at the time 
of their injury. this unsatisfactory position, created by persistent ambiguity in the 
eCthr’s jurisprudence, means that at present it is not until many years later when the 
eCthr rules on the applications that the state and individuals can fully appreciate 
what rights were owed and by whom.
4. Russia’s Responsibility for Human Rights
similar to ukraine’s responsibility for its volunteer battalions, a question arises 
as to whether the actions of pro-russian rebels can be attributed to the russian 
state. this issue turns on the extent to which the state instructs, directs or controls 
the armed group.223 Given the persistent denial by russian representatives of any 
involvement, it may be difficult to prove that the rebels are either instructed or 
directed by russian authorities. depending on which interpretation is followed,224 
there may also be difficulty in establishing the more flexible condition of control.225 
three different interpretations of how “control” is to be understood in this context 
have been advanced in the literature. the first is that for attribution to be found, the 
relevant state would need to have “had effective control” of the operations which 
gave rise to the alleged violation.226 this interpretation arose in the Nicaragua case 
where the iCJ held that although the united states was supporting a non-state 
armed group known as the contras, it was not in effective control of “all operations 
launched… at every stage of the conflict.”227 this meant that any actions of the 
contras in breach of international human rights and international humanitarian 
law could not be attributed to the united states.228 talmon notes that “unspecified 
223  Crawford 2001, Art. 8.
224  salmon notes that “[t]he test of control of authorities and military forces of secessionist entities has 
become perhaps the most cited example of ‘the fragmentation of international law.” talmon 2009, 
at 496.
225  Gibney has noted that “the russian-ukrainian rebel relationship seems vastly weaker than that which 
existed between the united states and the Contras or that between serbia and Bosnian serb allies.” Mark 
Gibney, The Downing of MH17: Russian Responsibility?, 15(1) human rights Law review 169, 174 (2015).
226  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 
i.C.J. 54. this means that responsibility for conduct needs to be ascertained on a case by case basis.
227  Id. para. 106.
228  Id.
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claims of ‘involvement’ or ‘direct participation’ in certain of the secessionist entity’s 
actions will not be enough to establish effective control over a particular activity or 
operation.”229 the high threshold of attribution imposed by this test has been debated 
by commentators,230 and it has subsequently been followed by international courts, 
including the iCJ Bosnian Genocide judgment.231
A more flexible interpretation was provided by the Appeals Chamber of the 
international Criminal tribunal for the Former yugoslavia (hereinafter iCty) in Tadić.232 
here the Court was not directly concerned with the issue of state responsibility. 
instead it sought to establish whether Bosnian serb units involved in the conflict 
were acting on behalf of the serbia to internationalise a non-international armed 
conflict and thus bring with it culpability under Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. in coming to its decision, the Appeals Chamber noted that “[t]he 
degree of control may, however, vary according to the factual circumstances of 
each case.”233 the degree of control required “was overall control going beyond the 
mere financing and equipping of such forces and involving also participation in the 
planning and supervision of military operations.”234 the Appeals Chamber found in 
the affirmative thus applying the iCty statute concerning “grave breaches” of the 
Geneva Convention.
On balance both the “effective control” and “overall control” tests set a relatively 
high standard for the attribution of conduct to a state for the actions of other persons 
or groups. Although Cassese correctly notes that the “overall control” test is more 
helpful in addressing “widespread trends in the practice of the world community,”235 
it still may not be sufficiently flexible to allow for the attribution of responsibility for 
actions that have breached the eChr in ukraine. the Commentary on the Articles on 
state responsibility notes that “[e]ach case will depend on its own facts, in particular 
those concerning the relationship between the instructions given or the direction 
229  talmon 2009, at 503.
230  the test is described as “extraordinarily stringent” by Mark Gibney. Gibney 2015, at 170. Antonio 
Cassese also describes it as “a very exacting test.” Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests 
Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18(4) european Journal of international 
Law 649, 653 (2007). talmon notes that “it is still extremely difficult to establish the exercise of effective 
control by the outside power over individual operations or activities of the secessionist entity.” 
talmon 2009, at 503.
231  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007 i.C.J. 143–47.
232  Prosecutor v. Tadić, it-94-1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 15 July 1999.
233  Id. para. 117.
234  Id. para. 145.
235  Cassese points specifically to the support state provide to military or paramilitary groups fighting 
abroad, the increase in state sponsored terrorism and the use of national military units as peace-
keeping forces for international organisations. Cassese 2007, at 665–666.
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or control exercised and the specific conduct complained of.”236 Nonetheless, these 
particularly stringent tests generate significant difficulties in attributing conduct in 
the ukrainian crisis, particularly concerning the actions of pro-russian rebels.
Although clearly cognisant of the wider approach in international law, the eCthr 
has not set as high a threshold in its attempts to establish responsibility for the 
conduct of individuals or groups affiliated with a state. the Court has instead sought 
to cultivate a test where attribution is found when the individuals or groups are under 
the “decisive influence” of a Contracting Party to the eChr.237 this test emanated 
largely from the Ilaşcu litigation discussed earlier.238 in Ilaşcu the eCthr found that 
russia’s “decisive influence” over transdniestrian separatists in the breakaway Mrt 
was sufficient to establish the responsibility of the russian state for their conduct. 
specifically, the Court noted that the Mrt
remains under the effective authority, or at the very least under the 
decisive influence, of the russian Federation, and in any event that it survives 
by virtue of the military, economic, financial and political support given to it 
by the russian Federation.239
in the more recent judgment of Catan, also considered above, the Court reiterated 
the element of dependence in the relationship between the Mrt and russia noting 
that “the Mrt’s high level of dependency on russian support provides a strong 
indication that russia exercised effective control and decisive influence over the 
Mrt administration.”240 Moreover, the eCthr again noted that the Mrt existed “only 
because of russian military, economic and political support.”241 in Ivantoc, the Court 
further referred to russia’s connection as “a close relationship with the cause of 
russian military, economic and political support.”242
236  Crawford 2001, at 48.
237  talmon contends that the “overall control” and, as the eCthr’s “effective overall control” tests “broaden 
the scope of state responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle governing the law of inter-
national responsibility, which provides that a state is responsible only for its own conduct; that is to 
say the conduct of persons acting, on whatever basis, on its behalf.” talmon 2009, at 517.
238  See supra section 2.
239  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 25, para. 392.
240  Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 58, para. 122.
241  Id. paras. 122 and 123. koch notes that “Catan stands for the notion that the conduct of non-
state actors can be imputed to a state when that state exercises decisive influence over the local 
government.” koch 2016, at 183. talmon refers to this test as one of “effective overall control” over 
territory of the secessionist entity, however he distinguishes it from the “effective control” test used 
by the iCJ instead noting that: “[t]he effective overall control of the outside power is used as a basis 
for equating the authorities of the secessionist entity with de facto state organs or ‘agents’ of the 
outside power for whose acts it may generally be held responsible.” talmon 2009, at 509–510.
242  Ivantoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 153, para. 118.
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By applying these standards to the situation in eastern ukraine a case can be made 
that pro-russian rebels are, at the very least, under the “decisive influence” of the russian 
Federation.243 this argument would primarily be grounded in the military support that the 
rebels appear to be receiving from the russian Federation. in late 2014, NAtO released 
satellite imagery which purported to show “russian combat forces engaged in military 
operations inside the sovereign territory of ukraine.”244 senior NAtO official Brigadier 
General tak commented that NAtO had “detected large quantities of advanced weapons, 
including air defence systems, artillery, tanks, and armoured personnel carriers being 
transferred to separatist forces in eastern ukraine.”245 NAtO Commander Philip Breedlove 
further stated that the assistance being provided by the russian state to the rebels is 
offered in a variety of ways noting that “[f]orces, money, support, supplies, weapons are 
flowing back and forth across this border completely at will.”246
the OsCe deployed a special Monitoring Mission to ukraine in March 2014.247 At 
one point that year, the mission reported the sighting of “540 men and women in 
military-style dress” crossing the border in both directions.248 By June 2016, the mission 
had reported 52 border crossing convoys between russia and ukraine.249 this is further 
supported by the OhChr special Mission to ukraine which has noted that
243  the argument that they are acting under russian direction, instructions or control may be more 
difficult to substantiate. reeves and wallace argue with regard to russian involvement that “it is 
difficult to determine the full extent and scope of their control of the separatists, as the russian-
backed rebels are seemingly independent actors.” reeves & wallace 2015, at 382.
244  North Atlantic treaty Organization, NAtO releases satellite imagery showing russian Combat troops 
inside ukraine, 26 November 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
news_112193.htm. in discussing russia’s approach, remler notes that the russian approach has been 
characterized as “hybrid warfare,” noting that “russia’s campaign in ukraine is characterized inter alia 
by deniable (or at any rate denied) military support for pro-russian forces of ‘activists,’ including the 
(denied) deployment of combat troops among the local ‘activists,’ all aimed at disguising invasive 
warfare as civil unrest and civil war.” Philip remler, Ukraine, Protracted Conflicts and the OSCE, 26(1) 
security and human rights 88, 92 (2015).
245  he has further commented that “russia is reinforcing and resupplying separatist forces in a blatant 
attempt to change the momentum of the fighting, which is currently favouring the ukrainian military.” 
NAtO releases satellite imagery showing russian Combat troops inside ukraine, supra note 244.
246  ewen MacAskill, Russian Tanks and Troops Crossing into Ukraine, Says Nato Commander, the Guardian, 
12 November 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/12/
russian-tanks-troops-crossing-into-ukraine-nato-supreme-commander.
247  Organization for security and Co-operation in europe, Permanent Council decision No. 1117, 21 March 
2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.osce.org/pc/116747.
248  Organization for security and Co-operation in europe, weekly update from the OsCe Observer 
Mission at russian Checkpoints Gukovo and donetsk Based on information as of 08:00 (Moscow 
time), 22 October 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.osce.org/om/125776.
249  Organization for security and Co-operation in europe, spot report by OsCe Observer Mission at 
russian Checkpoints of Gukovo and donetsk: Fifty-second russian Convoy of 45 vehicles Crossed 
into ukraine and returned through donetsk Border Crossing Point, 23 June 2016 (Aug. 2, 2018), 
available at http://www.osce.org/om/248341.
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[c]redible reports indicate a continuing flow of heavy weaponry and 
foreign fighters throughout the reporting period, including from the russian 
Federation, into areas of the donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by armed 
groups. this has sustained and enhanced the capacity of armed groups of the 
self-proclaimed “donetsk People’s republic” and “Luhansk People’s republic” to 
resist Government armed forces and to launch new offensives in some areas, 
including around the donetsk airport, Mariupol and debaltseve.250
specifically the report notes that
[r]epresentatives of the “donetsk People’s republic” have recognised the 
presence within their armed groups of citizens of the russian Federation, 
including from Chechnya and other republics of the North Caucasus.251
these military contributions, in the form of personnel and equipment, made 
by the russian Federation to pro-russian rebels in Luhansk and donetsk present 
a strong case that the groups are under the “decisive influence” of the russian state 
for their actions to be attributable to it in litigation brought to the eCthr. with 
attribution therefore possible, there are two possible scenarios under which russia 
will be held to exercise jurisdiction.
4.1. Scenario 1 – Russia Exercises Spatial Jurisdiction over Eastern Ukraine
As well as establishing a case for attribution, the preceding section has identified 
many of the characteristics which are considered in the test of “spatial jurisdiction.”252 in 
February 2018, ukrainian authorities launched a new public policy which recognised 
that the areas in donetsk and Luhansk not under ukrainian control were subject to 
250  Office of the united Nations high Commissioner for human rights, report on the human rights situation 
in ukraine – 1 december 2014 to 15 February 2015, 15 February 2015, at 3 (Feb. 15, 2015) (Aug. 2, 
2018), available at http://www.ohchr.org/documents/Countries/uA/9thOhChrreportukraine.pdf.
251  Office of the united Nations high Commissioner for human rights, report on the human rights 
situation in ukraine – 15 June 2014, 15 June 2014, at 3 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.ohchr.
org/documents/Countries/uA/hrMMureport15June2014.pdf. the report further notes at 4: “there are 
credible reports from different sources, including the OsCe Observer Mission, that hundreds of people 
in military-style clothing have been observed crossing the two border crossing points of Gukovo and 
donetsk in both directions. the ukrainian Government and some civic groups report the delivery of 
weapons from the russian Federation to the eastern regions. On 19 september and 31 October, two 
further convoys were sent by the russian Federation to territory under the control of the ‘donetsk 
people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic.’ As on the previous occasions, the convoys crossed at 
the izvaryne border crossing point without the authorisation of ukraine, and were not inspected.”
252  talmon has noted how the eCthr consideration on the issues of attribution and spatial control frequently 
overlap: “these two questions, however, are not always clearly kept apart as the Court seizes on the 
element of ‘control’ to establish both extraterritorial ‘jurisdiction’ and imputability and seems to derive 
the one from the other.” talmon 2009, at 508.
STUART WALLACE, CONALL MALLORY 55
temporary occupation by russia.253 the statements by the OhChr further indicate 
that russian supported rebels exercise a high degree of control over the territories 
of Luhansk and donetsk. the reports by the OsCe and NAtO demonstrate that the 
separatist regions are somewhat reliant on russian military support to exist. in previous 
cases before the eCthr, there has been a tendency for the Court to recognise that 
support for a subordinate administration and control over territory are sufficient for 
a dual-finding of attribution and spatial jurisdiction. in relation to the turkish support 
for the trNC in the above-mentioned Loizidou case, the Court noted that
[i]t is not necessary to determine whether a Contracting Party actually 
exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities in 
the area situated outside its national territory, since even overall control of the 
area may engage the responsibility of the Contracting Party concerned.254
Later, the Court would reiterate this position in a further inter-state case between 
Cyprus and turkey
having effective overall control over Northern Cyprus, its responsibility 
cannot be confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials in Northern Cyprus 
but must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration 
which survives by virtue of turkish military and other support.255
with this being the case, there is a concurrent argument to be made that through 
its military support of pro-russian rebels, the russian Federation exercises effective 
control of the relevant area and is responsible for any violations of the Convention 
committed within those areas.256 As mentioned in the preceding section, a finding 
that russia exercises spatial jurisdiction over the areas controlled by rebels may open 
the gateway for the Court to absolve ukraine of some Convention responsibilities 
within these areas.257
while a finding that russia exercised spatial jurisdiction over donetsk and Luhansk 
would simplify some of the questions around who must guarantee human rights 
protection within eastern ukraine, there are several compelling reasons to suspect 
253  report on the human rights situation in ukraine – 16 November 2017 to 15 February 2018, supra 
note 12, at 28.
254  Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), Application No. 15318/89, Judgment, 18 december 1996, para. 56.
255  Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 35, para. 88.
256  Further evidence exists in the organisational structure of both the self-proclaimed donetsk and 
Luhansk people’s republics. remler has noted that these administrations have received recognition 
by comparable separatist groups within the region including south Ossetia. he comments that “[t]he 
crisis in ukraine has produced an enlarged group of unrecognized separatist polities in communion 
with one another.” remler 2015, at 93.
257  See supra section 2.
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that the eCthr may not take such an approach. Firstly, the Court tends to avoid 
finding spatial jurisdiction during live conflicts. As discussed in the first section, the 
Court failed to even test for spatial jurisdiction in iraq, both during the phase of active 
hostilities in Hassan,258 and while the united kingdom was in belligerent occupation 
of the south-east of the country in Al-Skeini.259 instead, the Court has appeared much 
more willing to find spatial jurisdiction in entrenched conflicts, when states have 
assumed control over regions for a prolonged period of time as illustrated in the 
Court’s jurisprudence arising from Northern Cyprus and transdniestria.260
As an extension of this, a second reason why the eCthr may be unlikely to find 
spatial jurisdiction is because of the practical implications this finding would have 
on other applications. if the Court concludes russia is exercising spatial jurisdiction 
in one case, it will open russia to liability for all violations of the Convention within 
that region. Judges at the Court have been reluctant to “open the floodgates” in this 
way in previous cases. in Loizidou, for instance, Judge Bernhardt’s separate opinion 
warned that the impact of the judgment would not be restricted to the applicant. 
instead it would also concern the “thousands or hundreds of thousands of Greek 
Cypriots who have (or had) property in Northern Cyprus.”261 the same would follow 
from a finding that russia exercises spatial jurisdiction in eastern ukraine. the 
complication of having to fulfil all rights and responsibilities under the Convention 
when spatial jurisdiction is exercised has been discussed earlier.262
A third reason why the eCthr may not find that russia is exercising “spatial 
jurisdiction” in eastern ukraine is how politically charged such a decision would 
be. recognising that russia was in control of eastern ukraine would be highly 
controversial and, although judgments should not be influenced by the potential 
responses of contracting states, it would almost certainly result in a backlash against 
the Court,263 and may even affect any peace talks aimed at finding a political settlement 
to the dispute.264 referring again to the Loizidou judgment, white commented at the 
258  Hassan v. United Kingdom, supra note 14.
259  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18.
260  Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), supra note 254; Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 35; Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova 
and Russia, supra note 25; Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 58.
261  Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), supra note 254 (separate Opinion of Judge Bernhardt), para. 1.
262  See supra section 2.2.2 “is upholding All Convention rights in Crimea Feasible?”
263  the russian Federation has a particularly tense relationship with the Court. this is explored below 
in the Observations section. See also Courtney hillebrecht, The Rocky Relationship Between Russia 
and the European Court of Human Rights, washington Post, 23 April 2014 (Aug. 2, 2018), available 
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/23/the-rocky-relationship-
between-russia-and-the-european-court-of-human-rights/.
264  this was a further concern raised by Judge Jambrek in his dissenting opinion on the Loizidou merits. 
“Given that efforts are under way to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem within 
uN, Ce and other international bodies, a judgment of the european Court may appear as prejudicial.” 
Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), supra note 254 (separate Opinion Judge Jambrek), para. 7.
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time that the finding was either very courageous, given the political context the 
eCthr faced, or very unwise given the on-going nature of the dispute which was 
embedded in both historical and political disagreements.265
rather than finding spatial jurisdiction, it is more likely that the eCthr will 
determine that pro-russian rebels exercise personal jurisdiction over the individuals 
in eastern ukraine. that approach, however, is also not free from difficulty.
4.2. Scenario 2 – Russia Exercises Personal Jurisdiction over Individuals Within 
Eastern Ukraine
Personal jurisdiction, like spatial, is most commonly dependent on the exercise 
of de facto control – this time by a state agent over an individual as opposed to an 
area. the eCthr’s lack of consistency in ascertaining de facto control is clear with 
regard to personal jurisdiction. Before discussing this approach, it is important to 
remember the critical distinction in the obligations owed by the state in exercising 
personal rather than spatial jurisdiction under the eChr. while a state which exercises 
spatial jurisdiction is obligated to fulfil all the rights within the Convention, personal 
jurisdiction only requires the state to secure rights that are “relevant to the situation 
of that individual.”266 the Court has commented that “[i]n this sense, therefore, the 
Convention rights can be ‘divided and tailored.’”267 how this is to be interpreted is 
wholly unclear. As Miltner notes, the Court can now possibly “cherry pick” which 
rights are applicable in a given situation.268 this approach further suggests that the 
rights can be internally tailored so that some of the obligations within the rights 
will not need to be fulfilled. For instance, this may mean that a state only needs to 
fulfil the procedural components of the right to life, but not the substantive negative 
restrictions on taking life, or vice versa.269 the obscurity of this again leaves states 
with little guidance as to which rights and duties they owe when overseas.
Beyond this initial ambiguity, this section offers analysis of three competing 
interpretations of how de facto control over individuals gives rise to personal 
jurisdiction, and how these interpretations may be applied in the context of violations 
committed by pro-russian rebels during the conflict in eastern ukraine. As with 
spatial jurisdiction, these approaches are rife with internal contradictions and are 
265  robin C.A. white, Tackling Political Disputes Through Individual Applications, 1 european human rights 
Law review 61, 71 (1998).
266  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 137.
267  Id.
268  Miltner 2012, at 697.
269  Bearing in mind that in Al-Skeini the Court was not posed with the question of whether the right 
to life had been breached in the shooting of unarmed civilians, rather instead whether the right 
had been breached due to the failure to set-up an independent and effective investigation into the 
deaths. Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18.
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often incompatible with one another. the result is a lack of clarity concerning when 
and where the Convention applies.
4.2.1. Pro-Russian Rebels Exercise Direct Control over Individuals Through Custody
the first of these approaches suggests that de facto control will only give rise to 
a jurisdictional link where the victim has been brought within the custody of a state 
agent. there have been numerous reports of individuals being abducted, captured and 
detained against their will by pro-russian rebels in eastern ukraine.270 One example is 
the capture of Nadiya savchenko, a servicewoman in the ukrainian Air Force, by pro-
russian separatists in Luhansk.271 she has applied to the eCthr alleging breaches of 
Article 5, the right to liberty and security, and Article 6, the right to a fair trial within 
a reasonable time.272 A preliminary question that may arise in this case is whether russia 
exercised jurisdiction over Ms savchenko when she was captured in ukraine, before 
she was transferred to the voronezh region of the russian Federation.273
the extent to which physical custody equates to control was addressed by the 
eCthr in Al-Skeini where it was stated that
the Court’s case law demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, the 
use of force by a state’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the 
individual thereby brought under the control of the state’s authorities into the 
state’s Art. 1 jurisdiction. this principle has been applied where an individual 
is taken into the custody of state agents abroad.274
A critical deconstruction of this passage is necessary to understand the eCthr’s 
approach. Although the core of the message here is clear, that jurisdiction arises 
through de facto control when an individual is within the custody of state agents, 
the statement is riddled with inconsistencies and potential qualifications. First, the 
eCthr’s reference to the “use of force” is ambiguous. typically, the term is used to 
270  OhChr report June 2016, supra note 9, at 13–17. Amnesty international, ukraine: Overwhelming New 
evidence of Prisoners Being tortured and killed Amid Conflict, 25 May 2015 (Aug. 2, 2018), available 
at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/05/ukraine-new-evidence-prisoners-tortured-and-
killed-amid-conflict/; Lily hyde, Lost Souls from the Ukrainian War, Foreign Policy, 30 March 2016 (Aug. 2, 
2018), available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/30/lost-souls-from-the-ukrainian-war-russia-
prisoners-detainees-exchanges/; international Committee of the red Cross, ukraine: iCrC Facilitates 
release and transfer of Conflict-related detainees, 29 October 2015 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://
www.icrc.org/en/document/ukraine-icrc-facilitates-release-and-transfer-conflict-related-detainees.
271  OhChr report August 2014, supra note 212, at 11.
272  Savchenko v. Russia, Application No. 50171/14 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/
conversion/pdf/?library=eChr&id=003-5014897-6157176&filename=003-5014897-6157176.pdf.
273  OhChr report June 2016, supra note 9, at 22.
274  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 136.
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describe the resort to military force by states,275 or the use of lethal and other forms 
of force by state agents in a human rights context.276 in this quote, the eCthr uses it 
to describe custody and detention, which gives rise to questions over whether the 
eCthr is implicitly excluding the use of deadly force from this basis of jurisdiction? 
this ambiguity is considered further below.
second, the eCthr notes that jurisdiction does not arise in every instance involving 
“the use of force,” but only “in certain circumstances” and the use of force “may bring” 
an individual into Article 1 jurisdiction. the level of conditionality here is palpable and 
it leaves the eCthr with a large amount of flexibility to extend jurisdiction on an ad 
hoc basis. A third notable feature of the statement is the incomprehensible language 
of the clause’s dominant sentence, specifically the phrase “bring an individual thereby 
brought under the control of the state’s authorities.”277 this wording suggests that 
the use of force may not bring an individual within the state’s jurisdiction unless 
that individual is thereby brought under control. thus, it is not clear exactly when 
jurisdiction would arise. this ambiguity falls at the precise moment when clarity is 
most needed.278
the uncertainty is only resolved when one looks further at the cases the eCthr 
has used to justify this position.279 the Court notes that the rule has been applied 
where an individual is taken into the custody of agents abroad and cites four cases 
to support this proposition that custody equates to de facto control, however when 
the facts of those cases are examined some key differences emerge. For instance, the 
Court in Al-Skeini noted that jurisdiction arose in the case of Öcalan v. Turkey, because 
the kurdish rebel leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was arrested at Nairobi international 
Airport in kenya before being boarded onto a turkish aircraft and forcibly returned 
to turkish territory.280 in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, the applicants, who were suspected 
of killing a British soldier, were arrested and taken into uk custody at a military 
275  Charter of the united Nations, Art. 2(4); declaration on Principles of international Law Concerning 
Friendly relations and Cooperation Among states in Accordance with the Charter of the united 
Nations.
276  Convention for the Protection of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 2(1).
277  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 136.
278  this ambiguous statement has since been interpreted by the inter-American Commission on human 
rights in Ameziane v. United States, where an individual had been apprehended in Pakistan and 
detained in various us military facilities. the inter-American Commission on human rights implied 
that the instantaneous act of apprehending him was of itself decisive in creating the jurisdictional 
link and cited the aforementioned paragraph in Al-Skeini as authority. the Commission referred to 
the “exercise of physical power and control over the person in question” as “the decisive element” in 
finding jurisdiction. Ameziane v. United States, iAChr report No. 17/12, Petition P-900-08, Admissibility 
(20 March 2012), para. 31.
279  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 136.
280  Öcalan v. Turkey (Merits), supra note 40.
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detention facility in iraq.281 in Medvedyev, French commandos took control of a ship 
and its crew in international waters. the eCthr held that French authorities had 
“exercised full and exclusive control over the [ship] and its crew” from the point of 
interception until the ship’s arrival in a French port.282 Finally, in Issa, it was alleged 
that turkish soldiers had taken a group of shepherds into their custody in Northern 
iraq, brought them to a nearby cave and executed them. Although the eCthr ruled 
there was insufficient evidence to establish a jurisdictional link to the soldiers, had 
the facts been accepted, the deceased would have been within turkish jurisdiction 
by virtue of the soldiers’ authority and control over them.283
By stating that these cases underpin the idea that de facto control equates to 
custody, the eCthr is presenting a retrospective reinterpretation of its own rulings. 
in Al-Saadoon, for example, the eCthr held that jurisdiction arose because the uk 
was exercising control “over premises” within which the applicants were located, 
i.e. the detention facility, and not individual persons.284 similarly, in Medvedyev the 
jurisdictional link appears to arise from the de facto control that French commandos 
exercised over the applicants’ vessel, and not the applicants themselves.285 the 
selective re-evaluation is most evident with the Issa case. when the Grand Chamber 
considered the facts of this case in Al-Skeini, it read the case to mean that if it had 
been established that the victims were taken into custody, brought to a nearby cave 
and then executed, jurisdiction would have been established. yet there is no mention 
of this approach whatsoever in Issa. instead the eCthr had considered whether 
turkey could have been exercising spatial jurisdiction on a temporary basis, stating 
that “in the case under consideration what is crucial is whether the turkish troops 
exercised effective control over the area where the killings took place.”286 indeed, of 
the four cases that the Court relies on to establish this rule, only Öcalan is followed 
without being subjectively reinterpreted.
Notwithstanding the awkward syntax deployed and the questionable inter-
pretation of previous jurisprudence, there is a strong suggestion that the Court in 
Al-Skeini was attempting to establish that de facto control only gives rise to jurisdiction 
when an individual is brought within a state agent’s custody. in savchenko’s case 
then, she would have fallen within russian jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 
from the moment that she was captured and brought under the rebel group’s 
physical control.
281  Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, supra note 124.
282  Medvedyev v. France, supra note 113, para. 67.
283  Issa and Others v. Turkey, supra note 87.
284  Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, supra note 124, para. 88.
285  Medvedyev v. France, supra note 113, para. 67.
286  Issa and Others v. Turkey, supra note 87, paras. 74–76.
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4.2.2. Pro-Russian Rebels Exercise Control over Individuals Due to Their Location
despite this purported focus on the exercise of de facto control over individuals, 
the Court has also developed an approach which looks to the control a state exercises 
over spaces and locations rather than people.287 this interpretation is again illustrative 
of the eCthr’s inconsistent attitude to the meaning of de facto control in personal 
jurisdiction.
this approach will be relevant to the hundreds of cases involving soldiers and 
civilians who have been detained on either side of the conflict.288 One OhChr 
report on the human rights situation in ukraine gives the account of a ukrainian 
serviceman who was captured in August 2015 by four members from a battalion of 
the “donetsk People’s republic.”289 the serviceman was taken to a private house where 
he was beaten, threatened and tortured with electric shocks for a number of hours. 
eventually he was transported to a military base in the centre of Makiivka.290 the 
question which arises from these facts is when did the serviceman fall within russian 
jurisdiction and at what point did russia become responsible for guaranteeing the 
protection of his human rights?
Following the above approach of physical custody equating to de facto control 
and thus jurisdiction, the serviceman would have fallen into russian jurisdiction from 
the moment of his capture. the eCthr, however, has not always remained loyal to 
that position, instead leaning towards an approach where jurisdiction arises because 
of the control exercised over a location. the term “location” in this sense covers 
a multitude of small spatial areas including fixed premises like military facilities and 
prisons, vehicles and checkpoints. the distinctive characteristic is that the test looks 
at the location primarily, rather than the person.
Given the general difficulties inherent in establishing clear lines of responsibility 
here, there is an obvious attraction toward such an approach. After all, locations are 
generally much easier to secure control over as they can be fortified, defended and 
a degree of permanence can be established over them. the problem is that such an 
interpretation is simply unworkable in a human rights framework as it fundamentally 
distinguishes between beneficiaries of human rights, and those who lie outside 
human rights protection, on the basis of inches and feet.291 Clearly a state will have 
287  the terminology of the uk Courts in labelling this basis was to term it as “quasi-territorial” jurisdiction 
rix J, R (on the application of Al-Skeini and Others) v. Secretary of State for Defence (the Redress Trust 
intervening) [2004] e.w.h.C. 2911 (Admin), para. 270.
288  russian soldiers detained in ukraine Face Life imprisonment – Lawyer, ukraine today, 26 August 
2015 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://uatoday.tv/politics/russian-soldiers-detained-in-ukraine-face-
life-imprisonment-lawyer-482047.html.
289  OhChr report June 2016, supra note 9, at 15.
290  Id.
291  Milanovic 2012, at 129.
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better control over a fortified military outpost, or prison, than they do on the streets 
while deployed abroad. Nonetheless, there is a compelling argument to say that, 
as in the example given, the level of control exercised over an individual is equal 
whether they are captured and brought to a military facility and tortured or captured 
and taken to a remote location off base where they are also tortured.
in the example given, the question would be whether sufficient control was 
exercised over the private house where the serviceman was tortured to trigger 
his Convention rights. if the answer is no, then on the basis of this location-based 
approach he would not have been owed any obligations until he arrived at the 
military base. the eCthr in Al-Skeini recognised the unsustainability of this approach 
and elected to establish a test of de facto control over the person stating that it
does not consider that jurisdiction in the above cases arose solely from 
the control exercised by the contracting state over the buildings, aircraft or 
ship in which the individuals were held. what is decisive in such cases is the 
exercise of physical power and control over the person in question.292
here the Court has strained to clarify that custody through the exercise of de facto 
control refers specifically to the exercise of power and control over the individual 
and not a place. Milanovic notes that the inclusion of the word “solely” here will 
leave the door open for future wider interpretations on a spatial basis and, as will 
be demonstrated, this is exactly what the Court has done subsequently.293
despite taking these steps to clarify that personal jurisdiction arises through de 
facto control when an individual is taken into custody, the eCthr almost immediately 
turned to the notion that personal jurisdiction held some form of spatial quality.294 On 
the same day that the Al-Skeini judgment was delivered, a Grand Chamber composed 
of exactly the same judges handed down the Al-Jedda judgment.295 this application 
concerned a violation of the right to liberty of an iraqi civilian interned by British 
forces in southern iraq.296 the Court held that the individual was within uk jurisdiction 
because he was “within a detention facility in Basra City, controlled exclusively by 
British forces.”297 in this case, the Court derived a jurisdictional link from control 
over the facility, not from the physical control exercised over the individual. it was 
292  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 136.
293  Milanovic 2012, at 128.
294  this approach was consistent with the Court’s ultimate finding of jurisdiction in Al-Skeini which, 
although purportedly being based on personal principles, held a spatial element in relation to the 
exercise of public powers.
295  Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, supra note 125.
296  Id. paras. 9–15.
297  Id. para. 85.
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also determinative that the control exercised was exclusive. Presumably the Court 
intended for it to be consequential that complete control over a facility resulted in 
direct control over a person, yet the lack of consistency is obvious.
the case of Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy is another such example.298 this application 
concerned the interception and “push back” of a migrant vessel at sea by the 
italian coastguard. the applicants had been taken from their skiff and placed on 
an italian coastguard vessel before being returned to Libya. they alleged that their 
return violated the non-refoulement obligations in Article 3’s prohibition on torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. when examining whether the 
applicants fell within italian jurisdiction while aboard the italian vessel, the Court, 
citing Al-Skeini, referred to the need for “full and exclusive control over a prison or 
a ship” to give rise to a jurisdictional link.299 the Court in Al-Skeini had not specifically 
referred to the need for control over place or vehicle at all, in fact, as illustrated above, 
it stated quite the opposite.300
the eCthr returned to the idea that control equates to the exercise of physical 
power over the individual in custody. in Hassan v. United Kingdom, mentioned above, 
the Court noted that
[f ]ollowing his capture by British troops early in the morning of 23 April 
2003, until he was admitted to Camp Bucca later that afternoon, tarek hassan 
was within the physical power and control of the united kingdom soldiers 
and therefore fell within united kingdom jurisdiction.301
this brings the discussion back full circle to the position where jurisdiction 
through force can be found, but only when direct physical control is exercised over 
an individual in custody.
in the case of Jaloud, the Court appeared to stretch this location-based approach to 
de facto control even further. Jaloud concerned the death of an iraqi civilian who was 
killed when iraqi and dutch soldiers fired upon his car as it approached a checkpoint 
in April 2004.302 the Court found jurisdiction on the basis that the dutch forces 
exercised “authority and control over persons passing through the checkpoint.”303 
thus, the de facto control being exercised was primarily over a checkpoint rather 
298  Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, supra note 28.
299  Id. para. 73.
300  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 136.
301  Hassan v. United Kingdom, supra note 14, para. 76.
302  the applicants in this case argue that the firing of a bullet is a result of the authority and control 
which the dutch forces in iraq exercised over the victim at the relevant time. it was unclear whether 
the bullets which killed him were fired by the iraqi or dutch forces.
303  Jaloud v. Netherlands, supra note 36, para. 152.
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than the individuals in transit through the location.304 Aurel sari suggests that the 
Court’s approach in Jaloud was to make a finding of jurisdiction for any individual 
within a Contracting Party’s “sphere of control.”305 he notes that this flexibility “may 
stretch the extra-territorial applicability of the eChr to its breaking point.”306
Focusing specifically on the ukrainian serviceman who was tortured off-base, there 
remains a degree of uncertainty as to how he would fall within russian jurisdiction. 
Although jurisdiction is likely to be found based on the control exercised over him 
directly on capture, it may alternatively be found due to the control exercised over 
either the private house or military facility. thus, a potential grey area arises between 
when he was captured and taken to the private house, which states may seek to 
exploit by arguing that they did not appreciate their obligations would extend in 
such circumstances.
4.2.3. Pro-Russian Rebels Exercise Control Through Instantaneous Acts
the eCthr has traditionally refused to recognise that jurisdiction can arise from 
instantaneous acts, i.e. that an individual falls within the jurisdiction of a state simply 
by virtue of having suffered a human rights violation at the hands of that state’s 
agents. that approach was established in the, now much maligned, Banković case.307 
in this admissibility application, the eCthr held that individuals who had been injured 
or killed in a NAtO airstrike on a radio/tv station in Belgrade in 1999 fell outside the 
respondent states’ jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1. this is because the Federal 
republic of yugoslavia was not a Contracting Party to the treaty and the Convention 
only applied to european “legal space,” i.e. the territory of signatory states.308 thus no 
jurisdictional link could be found between the victims and the state forces that had 
304  A similar finding was made in the more recent Pisari case where russia was found to exercise 
jurisdiction over a check-point in Moldova. the Court noted that russia had exercised jurisdiction 
as the checkpoint was “manned and commanded by russian soldiers” – Pisari v. Moldova and Russia, 
Application No. 42139/12, decision (section iii), 21 April 2015, para. 33.
305  sari notes that “Jaloud suggest that a Contracting Party’s jurisdiction may be engaged when it deploys 
military assets to contribute to security and stability in a third country and brings individuals within 
its sphere of control, even without exercising direct control either over those individuals or their 
geographical surroundings.” Aurel sari, Untangling Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction from International 
Responsibility in Jaloud v. Netherlands: Old Problem, New Solutions?, 53 Military Law and the Law of 
war review 287, 301 (2014).
306  Id. at 314.
307  Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, supra note 28. this case has been the subject of extensive 
academic critique. See, for instance, O’Boyle 2004, at 130; Joanne williams, Al Skeini: A Flawed 
Interpretation of Banković, 23(4) wisconsin international Law Journal 687 (2005); stefka kavaldjieva, 
Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights: Exorbitance in Reverse?, 37(3) Georgetown 
Journal of international Law 507 (2006); kerem Altiparmak, Banković: An Obstacle to the Application 
of the European Convention on Human Rights in Iraq?, 9(2) Journal of Conflict and security Law 213 
(2004).
308  Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, supra note 28, para. 78.
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conducted the attack.309 the Court expressly took the position in this case that a “cause 
and effect” approach to jurisdiction in Article 1 of the Convention was unsustainable.310 
this decision was followed in Medvedyev where the Court referred to instantaneous 
acts equating to jurisdiction as an “excluded situation.”311
while some have argued that a cause and effect approach would be illogical,312 
the alternative runs into considerable normative difficulties when addressing cases 
which involve the use of force against individuals. As the argument goes, whether 
the state kills a person with a missile or after they are detained, it is still exercising 
ultimate power and control over them. drawing distinctions between such situations 
based on whether an individual is within physical custody or not would be arbitrary 
and, as expressed by schaefer, “arguably morally grotesque.”313 One former eCthr 
judge has described the distinction as creating a “ludicrous result.”314 Moreover, to 
avoid a jurisdictional link, the distinction creates a perverse incentive for states to 
shoot people, rather than attempting to capture and arrest them.315
in the ukrainian context, there have been numerous instances where individuals 
have been killed or injured when outside the custody of rebel groups and away 
from a location controlled by those forces. the targeting of Mh17 is perhaps the 
most profound example of this. in addition to the German mother who has brought 
a claim against ukraine to the eCthr following the death of her child in the incident, 
the families of a group of Australians killed on board the flight have also alleged 
that russia violated the right to life of their family members before the eCthr as it 
was russian-backed separatists who are alleged to have launched the missile which 
309  this case can be directly contrasted with the “Brothers to the Rescue case” at the inter-American 
Commission on human rights. Cuban military aircraft intercepted a civilian aircraft in international 
airspace and shot it down. when assessing jurisdiction, the Commission relied on a form of personal 
jurisdiction finding that the act of firing on the aircraft amounted to an exercise of authority over 
it: “the victims died as a consequence of direct actions taken by agents of the Cuban state in 
international airspace […] the Commission finds conclusive evidence that agents of the Cuban 
state, although outside their territory, placed the [civilian pilots] under their authority.” Armando 
Alejandre Jr., Carlos Costa, Mario de la Peña, and Pablo Morales v. Cuba, report No. 86/99, Case 11.589 
(29 september 1999), para. 25.
310  Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, supra note 28, para. 73.
311  Medvedyev v. France, supra note 113, para. 64.
312  Lea raible makes a case against the cause and effect approach noting that “saying that one can create 
obligations under the Convention by violating them is simply absurd.” raible 2016, at 161.
313  Max schaefer, Al-Skeini and the Elusive Parameters of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 5 european human 
rights Law review 566, 575 (2011); Milanovic 2012, at 129.
314  Loukis Loucaides, Determining the Extra-Territorial Effect of the European Convention: Facts, Jurisprudence 
and the Bankovic Case, 4 european human rights Law review 391, 400 (2006).
315  dominic McGoldrick, Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights in Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, supra note 24, at 41, 72; Milanović 2011, 
at 191; ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24(3) european Journal of 
international Law 819, 819–820 (2013).
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brought the aircraft down.316 if russia is not considered to exercise spatial jurisdiction 
over the area in eastern ukraine where the airplane was targeted, then the families 
would need to demonstrate that russia exercised personal jurisdiction over the 
individuals within the aircraft at the relevant time.317
in the years since the Banković case, the Court has found jurisdiction through 
de facto control on what can be described as an instantaneous basis on several 
occasions. the way the Court has done so, however, has only layered the confusion 
over what actions will give rise to jurisdiction. in the cases where jurisdiction has 
been recognised to arise in an instantaneous manner, that finding is often qualified 
by the existence of at least one other potentially determinative factual characteristic. 
A summary of the case law is illustrative of this approach.318
the earliest example of “conditional instantaneous” jurisdiction appeared in Pad.319 
this application concerned the deaths of seven iranian men at the hands of turkish 
forces. the cause of death was disputed. the applicants alleged that the men had 
been captured in iran near the turkish border and had been taken into turkey where 
they were executed.320 Although accepting responsibility for the deaths, turkey asserted 
that its agents had instead killed the men on turkish territory by discharging fire 
from a military helicopter. A Chamber of the eCthr ruled that turkey had exercised 
jurisdiction over the victims but did so without finding it necessary to consider 
whether the alleged violations had taken place in turkey or Northern iran. instead 
it sidestepped this critical issue by determining that it was unnecessary to establish 
the exact location of the helicopter as turkey had already admitted responsibility.321 
the result is that although this admissibility decision establishes the possibility of 
an instantaneous approach to jurisdiction, at best it only sets a very weak precedent 
and adds little legal certainty to the area.
the issue was again at the forefront of deliberations in two cases shortly following 
Pad. in the first case, Solomou v. Turkey,322 a group of Greek-Cypriot protestors entered 
the uN-monitored buffer zone between Cyprus and the trNC. One of the protestors, 
solomos solomou, ran to the turkish side of the buffer zone and attempted to climb 
316  Mh17 Crash: victims’ Families sue Putin and russia, BBC News, 21 May 2016 (Aug. 2, 2018), available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36350520.
317  the irony that this presents the Court with an opportunity to analyse the Banković circumstances 
in the reverse is not lost on Mark Gibney who comments: “One wonders whether the same result 
would be reached in the reverse situation, that is, where soldiers on the ground are firing anti-aircraft 
weapons up into the sky aimed at a civilian aircraft flying overhead.” Gibney 2015, at 176.
318  McGoldrick 2004, at 72; Milanović 2011, at 173, 191; Lawson 2011, at 70.
319  Mansur Pad and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 60167/00, decision (section iii), 28 June 2007.
320  Id. para. 8.
321  Id. para. 54.
322  Solomou and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 36832/97, Judgment (section iv), 24 June 2008.
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a pole where the turkish flag was flying. Before he could reach the top of the pole 
he was shot and killed by turkish forces. At the time of his death he was located 
on the territory of the trNC and so within an area which the Court had previously 
stated was subject to turkish spatial jurisdiction in Loizidou.323 despite this, the 
wording of the Chamber judgment is very different. it stated that “the deceased 
was under the authority/and or effective control of the respondent state through 
its agents” (emphasis added), thus implying the exercise of personal rather than 
spatial jurisdiction.324 the Court went on to find that there had been a violation of 
his right to life.325
Again, the Court appears to have found jurisdiction here on an instantaneous 
basis with the act of shooting giving rise to the jurisdictional link. Nonetheless, it is 
once again conditional. On this occasion the added condition is that the individual 
was already within an area under the effective control of turkey. it would remain 
very easy for a judge to treat the location of solomou at the time of his death as 
entirely determinative.326
the second case concerns events that occurred on the same day as solomou’s 
death. in Andreou, the applicant had attended a vigil being held at the uN buffer 
zone.327 while on the territory of the southern republic of Cyprus Andreou was 
injured by a series of bullets fired indiscriminately from turkish armed forces and/
or turkish-Cypriot uniformed personnel on the northern side of the ceasefire line. 
when considering the question of jurisdiction on this occasion, the Court came 
closer than ever to establishing an instantaneous notion of jurisdiction. it stated as 
the “direct and immediate cause” of the injury the applicant sustained was due to 
actions of the turkish authorities, she fell within turkish jurisdiction.328
while at first taking this expansive approach, the Court confused the issue by 
distinguishing the applicant from the victims in Banković. the Court stated that 
“[u]nlike the applicants in the Banković and Others case she was accordingly within 
323  Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), supra note 31.
324  Solomou and Others v. Turkey, supra note 322, para. 51.
325  Id. para. 84.
326  indeed this is what happened when the case was considered in a uk high Court in 2015. R (Al-Saadoon 
and others) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2015] e.w.h.C. 715 (Admin), para. 92.
327  the vigil was being held for the victim in the separate eCthr case of isaak. Isaak v. Turkey concerned 
the death of another Greek-Cypriot protester who had forced his way into the uN-monitored buffer 
zone between southern Cyprus and the trNC. there he was beaten to death by a group of turkish and 
turkish-Cypriot civilians and police officers. in assessing jurisdiction in this case the Court was able to 
establish that turkish-Cypriot policemen had actively taken part in the beating which led to isaak’s death. 
it subsequently held that, by virtue of these actions, Isaak had been under the “authority and/or effective 
control” of turkey at the time of his death and, as such, fell within its jurisdiction for the purposes of 
Article 1 – Isaak and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 44587/98, Judgment (section iv), 24 June 2008.
328  Andreou v. Turkey, supra note 113, para. 25.
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territory covered by the Convention.”329 the condition attached to this finding is 
therefore that instantaneous acts can give rise to jurisdiction on the territory of 
a Contracting Party to the Convention, but not outside it. even with this heavy caveat, 
rick Lawson has noted that it is difficult to maintain that the Andreou decision is 
faithful to Banković.330 Applying this standard to the ukrainian crisis would mean that 
any individual killed by pro-russian rebels would have fallen within the jurisdiction 
of the russian Federation at the time of their injury – but only because ukraine is 
a signatory to the Convention. if the approach is broadened to consider other extra-
territorial military operations currently being conducted by russia, syrian civilians 
who have been injured or killed in airstrikes by russian agents in Aleppo would not 
be deemed to be within russian jurisdiction.331
the final two examples concern the conflict in iraq. the first, Al-Skeini and Others 
has been considered in detail above.332 similar to the other cases addressed in this 
section it can also be perceived to be a conditional instantaneous act case given 
the circumstances in which some of the victims were killed. Of the six victims in this 
case, four were not within British custody when they were killed, thus eliminating 
the applicable de facto control test from interpretation 1. the first victim was killed 
while walking along a public street;333 the second during a raid on his brother-in-law’s 
home;334 the third by a stray bullet which entered her living room;335 the fourth was 
shot by a British soldier at a checkpoint while driving a minibus home from work.336 
despite not being within the custody of, or within a location controlled by, British 
forces, each of these victims were deemed to be within uk jurisdiction.337
the condition which accompanied the instantaneous jurisdiction in this case was 
that uk forces were exercising public powers in the region at the time, leading the 
329  Andreou v. Turkey, supra note 113, para. 25.
330  Lawson 2011, at 70.
331  the Court in Al-Skeini closed off the “legal space” argument as a barrier to the application of Convention 
obligations outside of the territory of Contracting Parties to the Convention. it stated: “the importance 
of establishing the occupying state’s jurisdiction in such cases does not imply, a contrario, that 
jurisdiction under Art. 1 of the Convention can never exist outside the territory covered by the Council 
of europe Member states” – Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, para. 142; emma 
Graham-harrison, Russian Airstrikes in Syria Killed 2,000 Civilians in Six Months, the Guardian, 15 March 
2016 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/15/russian-airstrikes-
in-syria-killed-2000-civilians-in-six-months.
332  See supra section 1.
333  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, paras. 34–38.
334  Id. paras. 39–42.
335  Id. paras. 43–46.
336  Id. paras. 47–54.
337  Id. paras. 149 and 150.
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eCthr to establish the “personal plus” jurisdiction referred to above.338 this condition, 
and the use of force which gave rise to control, were both necessary to the finding 
of jurisdiction. if public powers had not been exercised, then the individuals would 
have fallen outside the united kingdom’s Article 1 jurisdiction. Likewise, it was 
only the fact that state agents had exercised de facto control over these individuals 
when they were shot and killed which brought them within the state’s jurisdiction 
at the relevant time. Although the united kingdom exercised public powers over 
large swathes of Basrah, their obligations to those individuals only appeared to be 
triggered by the exercise of control over them.
the second iraq case is also mentioned above in relation to interpreting jurisdiction 
through de facto control over locations. Jaloud v. Netherlands stood as the clearest 
opportunity since Banković for the eCthr to make a direct finding of jurisdiction 
based on the use of force in an instantaneous manner. As mentioned, the Court 
found jurisdiction on the basis that the dutch forces exercised “authority and control 
over persons passing through the checkpoint.”339 despite this finding, the applicant’s 
son was only brought within dutch jurisdiction because he was shot while in transit 
through the checkpoint. Again, these two conditions, the control over the territory 
and the shooting of Azhar Jaloud, both appear to be critical to the finding.340
the dominant theme running through this body of case law is that although the 
Court will recognise that jurisdiction can arise instantaneously, it is not yet prepared 
to do so in an unconditional manner. Although these conditions appear to vary 
in significance, in almost all of the cases the finding of jurisdiction seems to be 
dependent on both the exercise of de facto control and at least one external factor. 
this inconsistency assists neither the state in determining the extent of its legal 
obligations, nor the families and victims of abuses who seek to hold the persecuting 
forces accountable.
raible accurately notes how every new judgment of the eCthr “seems to either 
add another layer of confusion or line of case-law different from the rest.”341 in 
relation to personal jurisdiction more generally, the Court’s tendency has been to 
find the existence of a human rights obligation. yet the way the Court rationalises 
the existence of jurisdiction is very inconsistent. this section outlined three diverging 
interpretations of when a state will exercise de facto control over an individual. the 
flexibility is broadly favourable towards the alleged victim of a human rights violation, 
however the uncertainty inherent in such a broad approach creates real practical 
difficulties for states in their efforts to delineate the extent of their human rights 
338  See supra section 2.
339  Jaloud v. Netherlands, supra note 36, para. 152.
340  rooney contends that the eCthr adopted an attribution test to make a finding of jurisdiction in 
Jaloud. Jane rooney, The Relationship Between Jurisdiction and Attribution After Jaloud v. Netherlands, 
62(3) Netherlands international Law review 407, 407 (2015).
341  raible 2016, at 161.
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obligations. when such obligations arise, states have little clarity over the extent of 
the obligations owed now that the Convention rights can be “divided and tailored.”
4.3. Conclusions as to Eastern Ukraine
to conclude our analysis of the application of human rights law in eastern ukraine, 
the situation is as unclear as its parallel in Crimea. the eCthr could determine 
that ukraine’s obligations will extend throughout its entire territory, subject to 
the derogations which have been filed. Alternatively, the Court could undertake 
a detailed factual analysis of the situation in eastern ukraine and either limit, or 
remove, ukrainian obligations on the basis of the loss of de facto control over territory 
there. the Court’s inconsistency in its previous jurisprudence on this issue makes it 
difficult to predict which approach it will take.
russia’s eChr obligations will be dependent on the recognition that the rebels 
in donetsk and Luhansk are under the “decisive influence” of the russian state. if 
this is established, it may still be unlikely that russia will be held to have exercised 
spatial jurisdiction over the areas in question. instead it is more plausible that russia 
will bear responsibility where rebels have exercised personal jurisdiction over 
individuals, through either taking them into custody, control over locations, or based 
on instantaneous acts. Although the personal jurisdiction approach is more likely to 
be established, the lack of clarity over which Convention obligations apply when such 
jurisdiction is found because of the potential division and tailoring of obligations, 
leaves another layer of ambiguity relating to what Convention rights apply.
Conclusion
we have explored the territorial and extra-territorial application of the eChr in 
relation to the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern ukraine. scratching 
beneath the surface of the jurisprudence of the eCthr has revealed a bewildering 
degree of complexity and uncertainty as to the potential obligations of each state 
in these conflicts. this section makes concluding observations about the practical 
implications of the Court’s chronically inconsistent approach to jurisdiction.
the first observation speaks generally to the Court’s broad approach in applying 
the Convention and how this may be followed in relation to ukraine. this was 
succinctly summarised by Judge Bonello in the Al-Skeini case. he said
up until now, the Court has, in matters concerning the extra-territorial 
jurisdiction of contracting parties, spawned a number of “leading” judgments 
based on a need-to-decide basis, patchwork case law at best. inevitably, the 
doctrines established seem to go too far to some, and not far enough to others.342
342  Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18 (separate Opinion of Judge Bonello), para. 115. Judge 
Bonello continues: “Principles settled in one judgment may appear more or less justifiable in themselves, 
but they then betray an awkward fit when measured against principles established in another.”
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the Court does not appear to follow any underlying theoretical or principled 
approach to its findings of jurisdiction. recognising this, several commentators 
and judges have attempted to articulate a coherent test for jurisdiction, but the 
Court is yet to follow any of these suggestions.343 with so many different threads, 
the most prudent way to predict which approach the Court may take in relation to 
the ukrainian crisis is to identify the factors to which the eCthr has accorded most 
weight. Of these factors, two will be particularly relevant for the ukrainian crisis.
the first overarching motivation is the Court’s desire to avoid a lacuna in the 
protection offered by the Convention. whatever conclusion the eCthr reaches 
concerning jurisdiction, whether ukraine still retains jurisdiction or russia is found 
to exercise jurisdiction, the eCthr’s primary motivation will be to ensure that the 
populations of these areas have full access to their Convention rights.
the second relevant overarching motivation which the Court is the avoidance 
of impunity. this is clearly expressed in the Issa case
Accountability in such situations stems from the fact that Art. 1 of the 
Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a state party to perpetrate 
violations of the Convention on the territory of another state, which it could 
not perpetrate on its own territory.344
this aspirational approach can explain much of the inconsistency which has 
developed over the Court’s recent jurisprudence. in many respects, although there 
had been ample jurisprudence which considered the Convention’s territorial and 
extra-territorial application previously, the topic was largely absent from academic 
343  Judge Loukis Loucaides proposed a test of “authority” in the Assanidze case. the question he thought 
should be posed was “whether the person who claims to be within the ‘jurisdiction’ of a state, high 
Contracting Party to the Convention, in respect of a particular act can show that the act in question 
was the result of the exercise of authority by the state concerned.” Assanidze v. Georgia, supra note 55 
(separate Opinion of Judge Loucaides). in Al-Skeini Judge rozakis suggested a structural reorganisation 
of the Al-Skeini framework. he proposed that there was no real distinction between effective control of 
an area and state agent authority and control. As a result, he suggested that the effective control of an 
area exception should form another sub-heading of the state agent authority and control exception. 
Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18 (separate Opinion of Judge rozakis), para. 13. 
Judge Bonello suggested a test where jurisdiction arose whenever a state has the power to perform, 
or not to perform, any of the following five functions: “first, by not violating (through their agents) 
human rights; secondly, by having in place systems which prevent breaches of human rights; thirdly, 
by investigating complaints of human-rights abuses; fourthly, by scourging those of their agents who 
infringe human rights; and, finally, by compensating the victims of breaches of human rights.” Al-Skeini 
and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 18 (separate Opinion of Judge Bonello), para. 10.
344  Issa and Others v. Turkey, supra note 87, para. 71. the Court in Issa was echoing the human rights 
Committee in Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay where the Committee had stated: “in line with this, it would be 
unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a state 
party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another state, which violations it could 
not perpetrate on its own territory.” Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, 
u.N. doc. CCPr/C/OP/1, at 88 (1984), para. 12.3.
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dialogue until the Banković decision of 2001.345 since 2001, there has been an 
explosion in jurisprudence and literature concerning the topic. the overarching trend 
has been towards establishing how states can be held accountable for human rights 
violations abroad rather than finding obstacles to the Convention’s application. As is 
evident in our section on instantaneous jurisdiction, apart from Banković, the Court 
has gradually expanded the scope of personal jurisdiction to encompass almost all 
situations which come before it. in cases emerging from ukraine it would therefore 
be unsurprising for the Court to pursue this underlying motivation of preventing 
states escaping accountability when they commit human rights violations abroad, 
by extending its interpretation of personal jurisdiction further. therefore, if russia 
is not held to exercise spatial jurisdiction in eastern ukraine, the Court may yet find 
inventive ways to establish the exercise of personal jurisdiction by russian agents.
this brings us to our second observation which is a practical issue touched upon 
throughout the analysis. the lack of clarity in the Court’s approach means that neither 
victims and their families, nor Contracting Parties to the Convention, know precisely 
when jurisdiction will arise, or which rights could apply when it does. Following 
the eCthr’s jurisprudence and subject to its derogation, ukrainian responsibilities 
could extend throughout the entire territory of the state, including Crimea and 
eastern ukraine. Alternatively, ukraine’s responsibilities may be limited to a currently 
undefined series of positive obligations. it is further possible that ukraine owes no 
obligations to individuals within these areas at all. russian responsibilities are equally 
unclear. russia may exercise full spatial jurisdiction throughout Crimea or eastern 
ukraine, or both. with spatial jurisdiction russia would be obligated to respect all 
rights within the Convention, including the additional Protocols which it is a party to. 
Alternatively, russia may only exercise personal jurisdiction over individuals within 
eastern ukraine. in this scenario, russia’s obligations would be “divided and tailored” 
to an as yet undefined list of rights which are relevant to the situation.
this chaotic picture presents acute difficulties for those victims of rights abuses 
in holding the state accountable. Beyond the question of whether they were owed 
obligations at the relevant time is the question of which rights are applicable. Not 
only are there significant differences from full obligations, some positive obligations, 
and only rights applicable to the relevant situation, but as ukraine and russia are 
signatories to different Protocols, the finding of which state exercises jurisdiction 
on the whole will affect which rights can be applied. For instance, while ukraine has 
ratified Protocol 13, which abolishes the death penalty in all circumstances,346 russia is 
only a signatory to Protocol 6, which while abolishing the death penalty, still allows 
345  Lush was one of the few commentators to engage with the issue – see Christopher Lush, The Territorial 
Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Recent Case Law, 42(4) international & Com-
parative Law Quarterly 897 (1993).
346  Council of europe, Protocol 13 to the european Convention on human rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms on the Abolition of the death Penalty in All Circumstances, 3 May 2002, e.t.s. 187.
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for executions during times of war.347 the Court’s inconsistent approach to jurisdiction 
makes the application of this law unpredictable.348
Our final observation is that this unpredictability creates severe policy implications 
in the ukrainian context, which may impact upon the Court’s relationship with either 
contracting state. Given that the Court has failed to clearly articulate rules for when 
the Convention will apply, there will be a degree of scepticism aimed at the Court 
by either state when it is adjudged to have exercised jurisdiction. For example, if 
ukraine is found to be responsible for the full array of Convention rights in Crimea 
and eastern ukraine, minus those which they have adequately derogated from, it 
would be expected that the Court will have come to this conclusion after conducting 
a detailed analysis of the situation and noting ukraine’s loss of de facto control. if the 
Court fails to take such an approach, as it did in relation to russian control in Isayeva, 
it will naturally open itself to further justifiable accusations of inconsistency.
A similar complaint could be made by russia if, for instance, it is held to be in 
“spatial control” of eastern ukraine. the question which could be posed here is why 
the Court would subject russia to the test for spatial jurisdiction given that it applied 
no such test to the British occupation of south-eastern iraq. Accusations of selectivity 
would also arise if, for instance, russia is held responsible for violations of the right to 
life concerning the downing of Mh17 through an instantaneous notion of personal 
jurisdiction where no such jurisdictional link was found for NAtO states in Banković.
Given russia’s current strained relationship with the eCthr, its response to any 
finding that it had breached Convention obligations in ukraine would be particularly 
significant. whether justified or not, the most likely reaction by russia would be to 
accuse the Court of politicisation and selectivity. speaking after the Ilaşcu decision, 
President vladimir Putin warned the russian people that
our country is coming into collision with a politicisation of judicial decisions. 
we all know about the case of Ilascu, where the russian Federation was accused 
of matters with which it has no connection whatsoever. this is a purely political 
decision, an undermining of trust in the judicial international system.349
Bill Bowring, expert on russia and the eCthr, noted before the uk house of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in May 2007 that “russia’s increasingly tense 
relationship with strasbourg raises the question of whether russia really wants to 
347  Protocol 13 to the european Convention on human rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the Abolition 
of the death Penalty in All Circumstances.
348  Brooke LJ who grappled with the Article 1 question in the British Court of Appeal hearing of Al-Skeini, 
noted that it is now time “to set rules which are readily intelligible,” Brooke LJ, R. (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary 
of State for Defence, supra note 85, para. 110.
349  Cited by Bill Bowring at house of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, inquiry into Global security: 
russia, 8 May 2007 (Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/
cmselect/cmfaff/memo/495/ucm302.htm.
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remain a member.”350 the strain in the relationship is further evident in the russian 
legislation passed in december 2015 allowing for the russian Constitutional Court 
to review rulings of international human rights bodies, including the eCthr, and 
declare them non-executable if they contravene the russian Constitution.351 None 
of this is to say that the Court should alter its decisions on the basis of potential 
political responses from states. instead, this observation demonstrates how the 
inconsistency of the Court’s decision-making process has the potential to exploit 
pre-existing tensions and allow for justifiable criticism of the Court. without a stable 
approach, the Court risks losing credibility and states may be encouraged to exploit 
gaps in the weaknesses of the Court’s jurisprudence.
the final comment to be made relates to the process the Court follows in finding 
jurisdiction. within this exercise it is argued that that de facto control remains the 
most appropriate characteristic which a Court can use to ascertain whether an area 
or an individual is within the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party to the eChr during 
periods of conflict. Applying this test means that Courts can look beyond complex 
legal questions and contentious political disputes to evaluate the precise situation 
on the ground and adjudicate effectively from that basis. yet if the Court continues 
to apply this test inconsistently its merits can never truly be realised. the crisis in 
ukraine has presented the eCthr with an opportunity to stamp new authority on 
its approach to territorially and extra-territorially applying the Convention. it should 
seize this opportunity to develop a test which is readily intelligible by all parties.
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